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OPSOMMING 
 
Die Suid Afrikaanse Vloot (SAV) het na die Eerste Wêreld Oorlog tot stand 
gekom omrede so „n inheemse vloot as broodnodig vir Suid Afrika beskou 
was.  Die SAV se rol en verantwoordelikhede was deur die geskiedenis gerig 
deur die behoeftes van die regering van die dag en van die politieke 
oorwegings van die oomblik.  Toekomstige verantwoordelikhede vir 
vredesteun sal insgelyks afhang van politieke oorwegings, sowel as die aard 
van, en bates beskikbaar vir, die SAV.  Tot dusver was die SAV bydrae aan 
vredesteun beperk tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op 
die Tanganjika meer in Burundi, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie 
Eskader met BBP werk in Burundi.  Hierdie geringe bydraes is onstellend 
omrede vredesteun pogings belangrik geag word deur die Suid Afrikaanse 
regering.  Die SAV sal dus „n groter rol in vredesteun in Afrika moet speel, en 
veral in die instandhouding van goeie orde op see, ten einde beter 
sigbaarheid te bewerkstellig. 
 
Die potensiële SAV bydraes aan vredesteun aktiwiteite moet dus nie slegs 
gesien word in die direkte SAV steun aan landmagte betrokke by vredesteun 
in een of ander land nie, maar ook in die bydrae tot die instandhouding van 
goeie orde in die ooreenkomstige maritieme omgewings in Afrika.  Potensiële 
SAV bydraes moet daarom in diepte ontleed word ten einde „n beter insig te 
vekry in die maritieme streke (veral in Afrika) waar tot dusver maar min 
navorsing gedoen is. 
 
Om hierdie potensiële bydraes te bepaal, is die tradisionele rol en doktrines 
van vlote (veral die wat betrokke is by vredesteun) ondersoek.  Daar is bevind 
dat die huidige doktrines, rol en take van vlote voortgevloei het uit die 
tradisionele rol van vlote.  Moontlike rolle en bydraes van die SAV is reeds 
beskikbaar in die SAV Maritieme Doktrine (2006).  Verdere moontlike bydraes 
spruit voort uit die verwagtinge van die verskillende streke in Afrika soos die 
deelname in Suid Afrikaanse opleiding, kundigheid en informasie, en die 
behoefte aan instandhouding van maritieme veiligheid en goeie orde op see.     
 
 iv 
Die huidige en toekomstige bates van die SAV (insluitende skepe, eenhede 
en personeel) blyk voldoende te wees om by te dra tot moontlike vredesteun 
aktiwitiete.  Die moontlike bydraes sal egter beperk word deur ontoereikende 
toekomstige begrotings en tekortkominge met betrekking tot kundigheid, 
toerusting en kapasiteit.  Trouens, die huidige en toekomstige begrotings is 
ontoereikend vir verdere vredesteun bydraes buiten dit wat tot dusver gelewer 
word.  Sonder „n toename in die begroting sal die vredesteun pogings van die 
SAV beperk bly tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die 
Tanganjika Meer, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader in BBP 
werk.  
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SUMMARY 
 
The South African Navy (SAN) was created after the First World War as an 
indigenous naval capability for South Africa was deemed necessary.  Its roles 
and responsibilities through the years have depended on both the 
requirements of the state, and the political realities of the time.  Possible 
future roles in peace support would therefore depend on political requirements 
as well as the capabilities and composition of the SAN.  To date, the SAN has 
only contributed to peace support by way of the patrols carried out by the SAN 
Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika, and assistance from the 
Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi.  The 
seemingly minor nature of this contribution is disconcerting, because the 
contributions of the SANDF in present (ongoing) peace support are very 
highly rated by the South African Government.  To enhance its visibility, the 
SAN should preferably play a more visible role in peace support in Africa, and 
generally in assisting in the maintenance of good order at sea around the 
African coastline. 
 
The potential contributions to or during peace support activities should 
therefore not only be seen as the direct support which the SAN can give to 
land forces carrying out peace support in a specific country, but also the 
support the SAN can give to maintaining good order in the corresponding, and 
other African, maritime zones.  Potential contributions and roles of the SAN in 
particular therefore need to be interrogated more comprehensively to foster a 
deeper understanding of this unexplored field of study within the peace 
support environment, and that of Africa in particular. 
 
To determine the possible contributions and roles of the SAN, the traditional 
roles and the doctrines of navies (specifically those involved in peace support 
operations) were investigated.  It was found that the roles emanating from the 
traditional roles for navies were assimilated into navies‟ doctrines, roles and 
tasks.  Possible roles and missions for the SAN are reflected in the SAN 
Maritime Doctrine. Regional expectations have added more roles and 
missions like the sharing of training, assets, expertise, information, the 
 vi 
requirement of maintaining maritime security and the maintenance of good 
order at sea. 
 
The assets available in the SAN (and the future assets) seem to be adequate 
to carry out possible peace support activities.  However, the potential roles 
and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by the scope of 
future budgets and the shortages of skills, equipment and capacity.  The 
foreseen budgets available will not allow participation in activities beyond 
those being undertaken at present.  Unless more funding is received, the 
potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support activities 
in Africa will probably not extend beyond some lake patrols and VIP 
protection. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.    BACKGROUND 
 
Histories from the ancient Mediterranean world (from 2 500 BC) mention 
navies consisting of rowed warships, called galleys, whose purpose was to 
control communications on the sea by defending friendly trade, disrupting 
enemy trade, and thereby gaining command (or control) of the sea.1  In 
modern times Mahan (1890) wrote that “if navies exist for the protection of 
commerce, they must aim at depriving their enemy of that great resource”.2  
He suggested that wars were won by driving the enemy‟s flag from the sea, 
and lost by failure to prevent the enemy from economically strangling one‟s 
own country.  Hence control of maritime commerce through command of the 
sea is the primary function of navies.3  Similarly Corbett theorised about 
operations at sea between fleets of traditional nation-states, whose concern 
was winning control of the sea and the subsequent exploitation of this control 
by either defending or attacking shipping.4  These theories held, and will hold, 
in times of war; but in peace-time, and under the stimuli of a range of 
twentieth century developments in technology, social attitudes and politics, 
redefinitions and amendments to the traditional roles of navies have had to be 
developed.5 
 
With navies being the armed elements of sea power,6 Tangredi defined 
modern sea power as “the combination of a nation-state‟s capacity for 
international maritime commerce and the utilisation of oceanic resources, with 
                                                 
1
 Potter, E. (ed).  1981.   Sea Power – A Naval History. 2
nd
 ed. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press,  p 9. 
2
 Mahan, A. 1897.  “Interest of America in Sea Power” in P. Paret (ed), Makers of Modern 
Strategy.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 455. 
3
 Mahan, A. 1890.  “The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783” in P. Paret, Makers of 
Modern Strategy.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 455  
4
 Till, G.  2004.  Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty-first Century. 1
st
 ed.  London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, p 74. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Tangredi, S.  2002.  “Sea Power:  Theory and Practice” in J. Bayliss, J. Wirtz, E. Cohen, S. 
Gray,  Strategy in the Contemporary World.  New York: Oxford University Press,  p 114. 
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its ability to project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and 
area control, and from the sea, in order to influence events on land by means 
of naval forces”.7  In addition, Gray stated that “a powerful navy at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century functions as an enabling instrument of 
national and coalition strategy”.8  Tangredi added to the above that sea power 
entails “the control of international trade and commerce, the operations of 
navies in war, and the use of navies as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, 
and political influence in peacetime”.9   
 
A major twentieth century stimulus for the redefinition of peacetime roles of 
navies was the collapse of the Soviet Navy, which impacted significantly on 
the peacetime roles and functions of global and medium-range navies.10  
There was no other ocean-going navy to challenge Western control of the 
sea, which left navies with the opportunity to focus on influencing events 
ashore.11  In Africa in the post-Cold War era, opportunities to influence events 
ashore have existed because of conflicts in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (among others).  The 
conflict in Somalia, for example, led to a complete lack of maritime security 
along the Somali coast, which, in turn, has allowed piracy to flourish along the 
Horn of Africa.  The causes of these conflicts are varied and complex.  
However, authors have listed as crucial factors access to and control of 
valuable natural resources (e.g. minerals, oil, timber, productive pastures, 
farming land and marine resources).12  Following on access and control of 
natural resources is the transportation of these resources, and bulk 
transportation invariably takes place along sea routes.  Risks (such as the 
increase in piracy) to transportation will threaten good order at sea,13 and 
possibly enhance the existing conflicts.  Ultimately these conflicts continue to 
threaten peace and security in the surrounding regions and the corresponding 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Gray, C.  1999.  Modern Strategy.  New York:  Oxford University Press,  p 227. 
9
 Tangredi,  op cit, p 114.  
10
 Tangredi, op cit, p129. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Lind, J. and Struman, K.  2002.  Scarcity and Surfeit – The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts.  
Pretoria:  The Institute of Security Studies,  p 2. 
13
 Till, op cit, p 311. 
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maritime zones, as is becoming apparent in the Gulf of Guinea.  Hence there 
is a need to support the measures for keeping good order at sea, as well as 
maintaining peace and security on land.    
 
In the United Nations (UN) Charter Article 1(1),14 the maintenance of 
international peace and security was defined as “to take effective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.  Peace support can 
thus be defined as supporting the measures taken to prevent and remove 
threats to peace, including suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of peace, as well as supporting the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes while conforming to the principles of international law 
and justice.  The scope of peace support activities (i.e. peace-making, peace-
keeping, peace-building operations, preventative diplomacy, and humanitarian 
operations), is then widened to include confidence-building and conflict 
prevention measures, as well as ensuring good order by adherence to 
international law. 
 
 The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, accepted in 1998 that the UN was 
responsible for matters of international peace and security, but lacked the 
capacity to address all the problems in Africa.15  He further stated that the 
provision of support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa was both 
necessary and desirable,16  and that Africa had to demonstrate the political 
will to solve its problems, for which political commitment (and funding) was 
required from the international community.17 Further support for the notion of 
sharing the burden of peacekeeping between the UN and regional 
organisations was given by the Brahimi report in 2000 on the reform of UN 
                                                 
14
 Charter of the United Nations at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm 
15
 Annan, K. 1998.  The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development at http://www.un.org,, p 9. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Annan,  op cit, p 23. 
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peace support operations,18 stating that where enforcement action was 
required, the Security Council would authorise other role-players to execute 
such action.19  These other role-players would be regional and sub-regional 
organisations willing to take on difficult enforcement tasks.  International 
authority for the formation of regional organisations was provided in the UN 
Charter in Chapter VIII (as pointed out in the “Agenda for Peace” by Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali) in so far as nothing precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security that are appropriate for 
regional action.20   
 
As a regional organisation taking on peace supporting tasks, the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) was unable to deal effectively with the many conflict 
situations in Africa during the 1990s, and perhaps even since its inception in 
the 1960s.  It was threatened with irrelevance if it did not change alongside 
shifting global and regional political, social and economic settings.21  The OAU 
Secretariat responded by drafting the constitutive legal text of the African 
Union (AU) which entered into force on 26 May 2001,22 which showed 
growing political will to move from non-interference to non-indifference.  For 
African peace support, growing international support and a growing regional 
willingness presented an opportunity for sub-regional organisations to 
contribute towards stabilising conflict-torn areas.  The OAU (and AU) 
recognised five main sub-regions23 with their corresponding organisations of 
which most were established as economic unions.  Although established 
initially with clear economic roles, most acquired over time a security and 
defence responsibility as well.  In fact, conflict and security have become their 
primary role, as opposed to what was declared and documented.   
 
                                                 
18
 Brahimi, L.  2000.  Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations at 
www.un.org/ga/55/fifth/work5.htm 
19
 Ibid, par 53. 
20
 Boutros Ghali, B.  1992.  An Agenda for Peace, at http://www.un.org, , par 60. 
21
 Neethling, T.  2004.  “Pursuing a Policy Framework for Peace and Security in Africa”.  
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol 26, no 2, November, p 4.  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid, p 12. 
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In the Southern African sub-region, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) treaty aims to achieve development and economic 
growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the 
peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through 
regional integration.24  Its structure includes the Inter-State Defence and 
Security Committee (ISDSC), and under the ISDSC‟s supervision, SADC 
committed to creating a standby brigade,25 the SADCBRIG.  SADCBRIG is 
one of five envisaged regional brigades for the AU to act as part of an African 
standby force. The SADCBRIG (which will have a maritime component to 
which the SAN will contribute) will be used to maintain peace and security in 
selected trouble areas and operate under the auspices of SADC, the African 
Union, or the UN.26   
 
Through the UN and the AU, legal authority thus exists for established African 
sub-regional organisations to carry out peace support in Africa.  Due to its 
SADC (and SADCBRIG) membership, South Africa is committed to assist with 
peace support in Africa in the future.  This commitment is also reflected in the 
South African Constitution, the subsequent White Paper on National 
Defence,27 and the White Paper on South African Participation in International 
Peace Missions.28  There can be no doubt that the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF), and by implication, the SAN, will be involved in 
peace support in Africa for some time to come.  In line with Tangredi‟s 
statements, the SAN should be able to influence events (such as peace 
support) on land, as well as assist in maintaining good order at sea.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
SADC profile in www.iss.co.za.  
25
 Berman, E.G. and Sams, K.E.  2000.  Peacekeeping in Africa:  Capabilities and 
Culpabilities.  Pretoria: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research:  Geneva and 
Institute for Security Studies, p 167.  
26
 Yekelo, G. at the SADC SMC Conference, June 2007. 
27
 Department of Defence, White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, 
ch 5, par 19 & 20. 
28
 Department of Foreign Affairs,  White Paper on South African Participation in International 
Peace Missions. 
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2.    PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Since the publishing of the South African Constitution and the two white 
papers mentioned above, SANDF involvement in peace support in Africa has 
grown, with soldiers deployed in conflict areas like Burundi, the DRC and 
Sudan.29  This was after official requests for contributions from the UN and 
AU, but not as part of a SADC force.  According to Vice Admiral Mudimu  
(present Chief of the SAN), the SAN contributed through the patrols carried 
out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika in Burundi, 
and by assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection 
duties in Burundi.30  The seemingly minor nature of this contribution is 
disconcerting, because the contributions of the SANDF in the present 
(ongoing) peace support are very highly valued by the South African 
Government, as can be gleaned from the 2007/08 Defence Department 
Budget Vote.31  During the vote, the Minister of Defence stated that the 
SANDF is the mainstay in most of the operations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, 
the DRC, Comoros, Lesotho, Sudan and the Central African Republic, and is 
contributing to the rising profile of South Africa.32  To enhance its visibility, the 
SAN should preferably play a bigger role in peace support in Africa, and 
generally in assisting in the maintenance of good order at sea around the 
African coastline.    
 
Aside from the aim of being visible to the politicians, the SAN will also 
participate in peace support because it is part of the missions allocated under 
the “Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in the Region and on the 
Continent” in the 2001 Military Strategy for the SANDF,33 as applicable to the 
SAN.34  The question that arises then is “How can the SAN contribute to 
peace support in Africa?” (other than border and VIP protection in Burundi).  
                                                 
29
 Le Roux, L.  2007.  The Revision of the South African Defence Review and International 
Trends in Force Design, p 276 in www.issafrica.org. 
30
 Mudimu, J.  2007.  Message by the Chief of the SA Navy on the State of Progress of the 
SA Navy during 2007, at www.navy.mil.za . 
31
 Lekota, M.  2007.  Defence Dept Budget Vote 2007/08, at www.polity.org.za 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Jansen, B.  2004.  “Comply with the Demands of an Uncertain Environment”, SA Soldier, 
Johannesburg, July 2004, p. 38 
34
 SANGP 100 – Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy, ch 4, in www.navy.mil.za.. 
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The potential contributions to or during peace support activities should not 
only be seen as the direct support which the SAN can give to land forces 
carrying out peace support in a specific country, but also the support by the 
SAN to maintaining good order in the corresponding, and other African, 
maritime zones.  These potential contributions of the SAN to peace support 
are quite underdeveloped.  Potential contributions and roles of the SAN in 
particular therefore needed to be interrogated more comprehensively to 
determine a deeper understanding of this unexplored field of study within the 
peace support environment, and that of Africa in particular.  The aim of this 
study was thus to explore the potential contributions and roles of the SAN in 
peace support in Africa.  
 
3.    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is a qualitative analysis and falls within the ambit of policy research 
with the aim of exploring existing policy and practices in order to make certain 
recommendations regarding the possible contributions and roles of the SAN 
during peace support on the African continent.  Included is an analysis of 
historical factors as well as of the present potential of the SAN.  The 
information is set against the political environment and expectations of getting 
involved in peace support operations.  Certain deductions are then made in 
order to answer the research question. 
 
The theory behind the research design of this study is that of a qualitative 
approach to social research.35  In the design of the study, it was decided to 
obtain data from credible sources like official literature, scholarly and semi-
scholarly publications, books on maritime strategy, seminar papers, magazine 
articles and unstructured interviews.  The data was then collected, analysed 
and interpreted, and is intended to inform SAN members in order to stimulate 
further discussion on the topic. 
 
                                                 
35
 Neuman, W.  2006.  Social Research Methods.  6
th
 Ed.  Whitewater, Wisconsin: Pearson, p 
14. 
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To answer the research question, an analysis was necessary of the types of 
peace support activities and the theoretical roles of navies over time, as well 
as the doctrines of some of the navies more visible in peace support (like the 
United States Navy, the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, the French 
Navy and the Canadian Maritime Forces).  Their past, and more particularly 
their present, naval contributions to peace support are important departures 
for this study.  Naval roles during peace support offer an indication of the 
contributions of different navies of different sizes in different locations of the 
world.   
 
In order to understand the present structure and vessel acquisitions of the 
SAN, the political mandate of the SAN according to SA Government, SADC 
indicators and AU objectives, together with the history of the SAN, is 
analysed.  Without this background information, future potential contributions 
cannot be identified with any confidence.  Having established the above, the 
potential contributions of the SAN can be formulated, and evaluated against 
realities like the budget, the national security environment, and the available 
assets of the SAN.  Recognising these realities is crucial.  In the absence of 
establishing what is possible, the potential contributions of the SAN remain 
mere theory. 
 
Geographical and temporal demarcations for the research are the following.  
The research is set to cover as many geographical areas as possible where 
peace support with naval involvement is carried out.  It is expected this will 
uncover a range of roles on which the contributions by the SAN can be 
modelled.  However, the investigation of these latter contributions is aimed at 
uncovering information and indicators useful to argue and propose possible 
naval deployments towards peace support in Africa.  The investigation of 
naval participation in peace support will take into account all peace-keeping 
operations since the Second World War.  Even though South Africa has 
fundamentally changed its approach to security matters since 199436, the 
research on the SAN will focus on its history and its present policies, with the 
                                                 
36
 Edmonds, M. and Mills, G.  1996.  Uncharted Waters. Johannesburg: SAIIA,  p 2. 
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aim of making recommendations for its future.  This time frame is used to 
identify the contributions that would match the potential of the present assets 
of the SAN, and hence serve the purpose of the study, i.e. to make some 
future projection of what needs to be considered. 
 
4.    PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the potential contributions and 
roles of the SAN in peace support in Africa.  In pursuit of the purpose, relevant 
sources will be scrutinised and evaluated in order to trace the debate on the 
contributions of the SAN in peace support, and even to suggest certain roles 
and contributions.  This is significant because little research has been done on 
the actual and potential SAN involvement in peace support.  Given the rapid 
deterioration of maritime security along the African west and east coasts, 
considering extended roles for the SAN beyond war-fighting only serves to 
underline the significance of the study.  Therefore, besides stimulating further 
debate, it will add to the limited available research material on, and be of 
significance in understanding, the potential contributions and roles of the SAN 
in peace support in Africa. 
 
A particular significance of the study is that the roles during formal peace 
support may have a broader application that stretch beyond the formal SAN-
peace support nexus.  It will therefore also be illuminating to investigate what 
kind of naval support the SAN can expect from other navies, when 
contributing to the maintenance of good order at sea.  For example, any 
seaward aid to peace support in Somalia will have to take in consideration the 
danger of the increase in piracy off the Somalian coast, and therefore will 
have to include support and protective elements, the size of which may be 
beyond of the capability of the SAN.  
 
5.    OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The dearth of literature on the topic of peace support activities by the SAN 
offers scope for the study and a rationale to pursue the research for the SAN 
 10 
and Africa in particular.  The literature and data sources consulted for the 
research can be described as: 
 official (but available on public media such as the internet);  
 scholarly and semi-scholarly professional publications (such as studies 
done by research institutions);  
 military (such as general SAN publications); and  
 accessible material (like newspaper and internet articles).   
 
Official literature included white papers tabled in the South African Parliament 
(like the White Papers on National Defence, and on South African 
Participation in International Peace Missions), SADC documents approved by 
the Standing Maritime Committee (SMC) of the ISDSC (like the SADC 
SMC1,37 and the SADC MPSO 1A38), the Modality Report on the 
Establishment of the SADCBRIG, and relevant documents from the AU and 
UN.  Military sources included SANGP 100, which is the Maritime Doctrine for 
the SAN, the SANDF Review 1998, and the American, British, Australian and 
Canadian maritime doctrines.  The South African official and military literature 
supplied the mandates in terms of which the SAN will carry out operations, 
and the foreign doctrines supplied the background for foreign navies‟ 
contributions to peace support.   
 
Scholarly and semi-scholarly professional publications used in researching 
this topic were books published by institutions like the South African Institute 
of International Affairs (SAIIA), and the Centre for Defence and International 
Security Studies, which had the services of authors like Greg Mills and Martin 
Edmonds.  Included in this category were journal articles published by 
academics from the Faculty of Military Science, University of Stellenbosch, 
and a publication from the Human Sciences Research Council by authors 
from the Centre for Military Studies and the Institute for Strategic Studies.  
The authors of these publications and journals analysed the military and naval 
challenges facing South Africa from the 1990s onwards, and made 
                                                 
37
 SADC SMC1 – South African Development Community - Standing Maritime Committee 
publication on “Organisation and Co-operation” of the committee.  
38
 SADC MPSO 1A – “Instructions for officers commanding on the conduct of maritime peace 
support operations” as approved by the Standing Maritime Committee. 
 11 
suggestions how to face these challenges.  For research on piracy, 
information was drawn (amongst other sources) from a treatise written by H. 
Fouche for the degree Doctor Technologiae at the Tswane University of 
Technology. Reference was also made to articles published in the United 
States Naval War College Reviews. 
 
Books on maritime strategy by A. Mahan, J. Corbett, J. Cable, G. Till and E. 
Grove were used to extract the traditional roles and contributions by navies, 
while the predictions by these authors on the possible future contributions 
were used in the compilation of the SAN‟s possible contributions.  A book on 
maritime security and peacekeeping by M. Pugh supplied information on naval 
contributions during UN peace support activities.  Pugh‟s focus was on the UN 
and its operations, but valuable information about historic naval contributions 
to peace support was included. 
 
Seminar papers from “ A Navy for Africa” and “The South African Navy and 
the African Renaissance Conference” were used where relevant, as well as 
material from the annual “Seapower for Africa” symposia, the 2008 
International Quality and Productivity Center (IQPC) and Centre for Military 
Studies (CEMIS) conferences on maritime security, Africa and its maritime 
environment.  Material from these seminars and the “Emerging Maritime 
Concepts Conference” in June 2007 was used to support the selection of 
possible contributions and roles for the SAN.  Similar use was made of the 
presentations delivered during the conference on SAS DRAKENSBERG on 
maritime security issues on the east coast of Africa held in November 2007.    
 
Magazine articles from magazines like “Jane‟s Defence Weekly” and “Navy 
News” were used to update and support the statements from the scholarly 
publications in the different chapters.  Unstructured interviews were conducted 
with the Flag Officer Fleet and a journalist from the “Jane‟s Defence Weekly” 
magazine.  The interviews were unstructured because the intended research 
questions on the potential roles of the SAN, generated in-depth discussions 
on the generic roles of navies, possible future roles for the SAN and the issue 
of piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
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6.    STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The thesis will be structured in five chapters.  Chapter One will cover the 
background to the research theme, the formulation of the research theme, and 
the problem statement.  The first chapter further contains the purpose and 
significance of the research, the methodology adopted in the research, the 
demarcation which narrows the research area down to a manageable scope, 
an overview of the sources consulted in the form of a literature review, and 
concluding remarks. 
 
Chapter Two comprises an analysis of the traditional roles of navies over time. 
Doctrines of selected navies more active in peace support, and their naval 
involvement in various areas of the world, and the origin of, and different 
options (from preventative diplomacy to peace building) for peace support 
activities are then presented.  A range of missions that have been carried out 
by various navies is thus isolated and used to point out possible roles, taking 
into account the sizes of the different navies and the specific areas where 
these missions took place.  This will be the background against which the 
possible roles for the SAN can be considered, bearing in mind the specific 
nature and structure of the SAN. 
 
Chapter Three is designed to provide a brief insight into the history of the SAN 
as a pathway to argue the nature of, and the reasoning behind, the current 
structure and composition of the SAN.  The size of the SAN will also be 
compared to other navies, in order to evaluate what can reasonably be 
expected from a navy the size of the SAN.  The expectations of SADC and the 
AU (as described in doctrine documents of the African Standby Force (ASF) 
and Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)), as well as the 
commitment already made by the SAN in terms of force contributions to the 
SADCBRIG, will also be taken into account to outline a background for the 
discussion in the Chapter Four.    
 
Chapter Four will evaluate the possible contributions by the SAN against a 
range of identified limitations, like the national security environment, the 
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impact of future budgets, and the available assets of the SAN.  The possible 
impact of these limitations is not intended to restrict the discussion on possible 
contributions for the SAN, but merely to acknowledge conditions that temper 
what is possible. 
 
Chapter Five will comprise of a summary, findings and recommendations for 
future studies. 
 
7.    CONCLUSION 
 
The UN has acknowledged that it does not have the wherewithal to deal with 
all the problems in Africa, and it has been made clear that Africa will have to 
assist to a larger extent.  Legal support for this assistance has been shown in 
the UN Charter, and it appears as if African leaders have acknowledged their 
role with the establishment of the AU.  The listed underlying causes for conflict 
still exist, and hence the possibility for conflicts will be present for some time 
to come.  With the South African government‟s commitment to assistance in 
Africa, there can be little doubt that the SANDF will be used more and more to 
participate in peace support.  The SAN is an integral part of the SANDF, and 
cannot afford not to be part of the major peace-time utilisation of the SANDF.  
It thus makes sense to discuss possible contributions and roles of the SAN in 
peace support in Africa as events on land create increasing insecurity at sea 
as well. The expectation is that this thesis should offer some fresh insights 
into contributions by the SAN and even stimulate further discussion on the 
topic.           
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADITIONAL ROLES OF NAVIES 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
The traditional roles of navies can be traced from the earliest writings on sea 
power, through history to the present-day thoughts of strategists and authors 
on sea and maritime power.   More roles were added to the traditional roles 
with changing political environments (the first naval contribution to 
peacekeeping was in 1948) and ever-changing technology (the threat of 
surface-to-surface missiles was first noted in the 1970s).  To confirm the 
validity of the traditional roles, the doctrines of navies will be analysed with 
emphasis on the roles in peace support (with peace support defined as 
supporting the measures taken to prevent and remove threats to peace, 
including suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, as 
well as supporting the peaceful settlement of international disputes while 
conforming to the principles of international law and justice).  The actual naval 
involvement of the Western navies in peace support will be investigated with 
reference to their planned and actual contributions to peace support 
operations/missions.  This investigation will show which roles are possible for 
navies of different sizes, and form the background against which possible 
contributions of the SAN in peace support can be considered. 
 
2.    TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF NAVIES 
 
Early sources on shipping suggest that the first role that fighting vessels in the 
Mediterranean performed was to protect maritime commerce.1  Navies 
therefore came into being because of difficulties in making the most of the four 
historic attributes of the sea, which are, according to Till, the use of the sea as 
a means of transportation and exchange, as a resource, a medium for 
                                                 
1
 Potter, E. (ed).  1981.   Sea Power – A Naval History. 2
nd
 ed. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press,  p 1. 
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information and the spread of ideas, and a medium for dominion.2  From the 
use of the sea as a resource, navies were charged with the role of protecting 
resources like oil, fish and other marine food-crops.3  The use of the sea as a 
medium for information spread Christianity as well as commercial interests 
that fostered co-operation, but also conflict, and hence the role of protecting 
the advance of religious and commercial interests was entrusted to navies.  
The sea was also used as a medium for dominion, as European nations 
created empires with the assistance of navies (undertaking sea control, 
projecting power ashore in peace and war, attacking and defending trade, and 
maintaining good order at sea4).   
 
However, the use of the sea as a medium for transportation and exchange 
(i.e. commerce) created the need for navies to protect trade and became an 
important reason for having a navy at all.  The formative years of the United 
States Navy can be used as an example.  By 1785, the US government had 
sold off all the warships used in the American Revolution because the US 
Congress concluded that the US Navy was an expendable luxury.5  It was the 
capture of American merchant ships by Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean 
Sea (and the subsequent loss of income) which fostered a desire for naval 
protection, which, in turn, led to the creation of the US Navy.   
 
Merchantmen could only ply their trade if the sea was not controlled by the 
enemy, and Mahan believed that control of maritime commerce through 
command of the sea was the primary role of a navy.6  In this role, Mahan 
favoured blue-water battle-fleet actions to dispose of the enemy, while Corbett 
emphasized the broader context of naval operations.7  Corbett understood 
that war demanded very accurate co-ordination between land and sea power, 
and this offered different ways of obtaining command at sea, like a blockade, 
                                                 
2
 Till, G.  2004.  Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty-first Century. 1
st
 ed.  London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, p 6. 
3
 Ibid, p 15. 
4
 Ibid, p 16. 
5
 Potter, op cit , p 85. 
6
 Mahan, A. 1890.  “ The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783” in P. Paret, Makers of 
Modern Strategy.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 455 
7
 Till, op cit, p 47. 
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a “fleet in being”, defence against invasion, and support of military 
expeditions,8 as opposed to Mahan‟s emphasis on battle between opposing 
navies‟ ships. 
 
However, in peace-time, there is no clearly defined enemy, and navies have 
different, but very relevant roles to carry out.  They have to deal with piracy, 
patrol against illegal immigrants, protect fishery and so on, because the huge 
capital outlays by states in acquiring navies cause the taxpayer to demand 
returns on the investment.  These typical peace-time roles navies are 
expected to perform are part of the traditional roles of navies.   
 
Booth explained that the sea is used for three purposes: passage of goods 
and people; passage of military force for diplomatic purposes or for use 
against targets on land or at sea; and the exploitation of resources in or under 
the sea.9  These purposes can be summarised as the military, diplomatic and 
policing functions of navies.10  Grove reconstructed Booth‟s use-of-the-sea 
triad by placing the military roles at the base of a triangle, with the 
constabulary and the diplomatic roles on the two sides of the triangle.11  The 
military roles (which are power projection, sea control and sea denial) are 
placed at the base of the triangle because most navies are primarily designed 
to perform these roles.  The diplomatic roles can be divided into showing the 
flag, and gunboat diplomacy; while the constabulary (or policing) roles are the 
maintenance of sovereignty and good order, safeguarding of national 
resources, and international peacekeeping.12  Hattendorf stated that all three 
roles are based upon the ability to put armed forces to sea, and the potential 
that they have to use force, even in peacetime.13  It is necessary to investigate 
these military, constabulary and diplomatic roles in more detail, because they 
represent most of the traditional roles of navies, based on ability and potential; 
                                                 
8
 Corbett, J.S.  1911.  Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London: Brassey‟s Defence 
Publishers, p 165. 
9
 Booth, K.  1977.  Navies and Foreign Policy.  London:  Croom Helm, p 16. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Grove, E.  1990.  The Future of Sea Power.  Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, p 233. 
12
 Ibid, p 234. 
13
 Hattendorf, J.  1994.  The Conceptual Foundations for Maritime Strategy in the 21
st
 
Century.  African Defence Review, no 18, p 2. 
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and because the peace support activities will be visible in the these roles.  
Also, the effects of changes in the political and security environment, and in 
technology, must be taken into account.  
 
Figure 1 – Grove’s triangle of roles (as adapted in the Maritime Doctrine 
for the SA Navy)14 
 
 
2.1.    MILITARY ROLES 
 
The military roles are sea control, sea denial and power projection.  According 
to Mahan, sea control can only be obtained by destroying an opposing fleet 
and thereby denying use of the sea to the enemy. Sea control can also be 
referred to as command of the sea.15  However, such complete control would 
require a highly capable, long-ranging fleet, and Tangredi argued that local or 
regional sea control (where control was only established over a particular area 
                                                 
14
 Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100. October  2006.  Simon‟s Town:  Naval 
Publications Depot,  p 8. Available at http://www.navy.mil.za/ 
15
 Tangredi, S.  2002.  “Sea Power:  Theory and Practice” in J. Bayliss, J. Wirtz, E.  Cohen, S. 
Gray,  Strategy in the Contemporary World.  New York: Oxford University Press,  p 123.  
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of the sea) was a concept more suited to today‟s navies which are not as 
long-ranging and capable.16  Most of the theorists on sea power now agree 
that command of the sea would not be absolute, but relative, and in this vein, 
Winston Churchill stated that command of the sea was ultimately about 
control in that part of the sea which was selected for operations.17 
 
Tangredi listed sea denial as the reverse of sea control, being the ability to 
prevent an opponent from using the sea without attempting to establish local 
sea control.18  Grove listed coast defence and “guerre de course” as sea 
denial missions,19 while Till argued that sea denial could be an alternative to 
sea control, or complement sea control.  For example, to Israel, the ability to 
prevent the enemy from using the sea would be a sufficient alternative, while 
to the former Soviet Union, sea denial complemented sea control in the “open 
ocean zone” because they did not have aircraft carriers to support their 
submarines.20  
 
Both sea control and sea denial involve the struggle for the use of sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs),21 while power projection ashore is one of the two 
strategic uses of the sea emanating from control of the sea (the other being 
the use of the sea as a means of transportation).22  Power projection ashore  
(also known as maritime power projection, and including amphibious warfare, 
combined operations, land-sea operations, overseas raids and invasions, and 
attacks on territory from the sea) involves the use of sea-borne military forces 
to influence events on land directly.23  The aims of power projection could be 
to determine a conflict, open new operational fronts, directly support land 
forces, force displacement, practice economic warfare, attack naval bases, 
force an inferior adversary to fight, or use political coercion.24 
 
                                                 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Grove, op cit, p 233. 
20
 Till, op cit, p 158. 
21
 Tangredi, op cit, p 123. 
22
 Till, op cit, p 193. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid, pp 195-199. 
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2.2.    DIPLOMATIC ROLES 
 
In carrying out the diplomatic roles of showing the flag and gunboat 
diplomacy, navies are generally more effective than armies or air forces in 
terms of their international acceptability and their capacity to symbolically 
send a message to a specific government.25  Tangredi defines naval 
diplomacy as the use or display of force without fighting.26  However, Cable 
points out that, while “showing the flag” is a general reminder to foreigners of 
the existence of the navy (with seldom any threat of force),27 gunboat 
diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, other than as an act of 
war, in order to secure advantage in the furtherance of an international 
dispute.28  Till offers a more modern interpretation: naval diplomacy is a 
continuum, a naval presence varying from coalition building to picture building 
to naval coercion.29 
 
Coalition building is defined as activities expressly intended to secure foreign 
policy objectives by influencing the behaviour of allies; while picture building 
concerns collecting, processing and disseminating data about the actions and 
policies of allies and potential adversaries.  Naval coercion is the use of 
coercive force to influence the behaviour of others by means short of a war.30 
 
2.3.    CONSTABULARY ROLES 
 
The constabulary (or policing) roles are the maintenance of sovereignty and 
good order, and international peacekeeping.  The inherent advantages offered 
by sea power are adaptability, flexibility and mobility,31 which enable navies to 
carry out constabulary roles although inherently designed for military roles.  
Among these constabulary roles, the management of good order at sea is 
                                                 
25
 Vego, M.  2008.  On Naval Power.  Joint Forces Quarterly issue 50, 3
rd
 quarter 2008, p 12. 
Also available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i50.htm 
26
 Tangredi, op cit, p 124. 
27
 Grove, op cit, p 194. 
28
 Cable, J.  1971.  Gunboat Diplomacy.  London:  Chatto and Windus, p 21.  
29
 Till, op cit, p 276.  
30
 Ibid, p 285. 
31
 Gray, C.S.  1999.  Modern Strategy.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, p 221. 
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very important during peace-time. Navies can help to manage the risks and 
threats faced when using the sea‟s resources, using the sea as a means of 
transportation and trade, as a means of gaining and exchanging information, 
maintaining maritime sovereignty, and protecting the maritime environment.32 
 
Among the resources from the sea, oil and gas, and fish and other living 
marine resources,33 will probably face bigger risks in the future than any other, 
which will translate into severe challenges to law and order at sea.  With one-
third of the world‟s petroleum reserves being under the sea, and reserves on 
land being steadily depleted, the threats to the safety of rigs and platforms will 
demand protection by navies. This is already being experienced in the Gulf of 
Guinea off West Africa.  The lost income to states due to illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing off the coasts of Somalia, Mozambique, South Africa 
and Angola is estimated to be about one billion dollars every year.34 The 
threats to shipping transporting goods along busy sea-lanes are well 
illustrated by the acts of piracy currently being carried out off the coast of 
Somalia,35 and to a lesser extent, around Malaysia and in the Gulf of Guinea.  
Absence of control along the sea-lanes also allows drug smuggling and the 
movement of illegal immigrants to continue unabated.36  Information about the 
future is currently being gained in the developing field of marine biotechnology 
and in oceanographic research, and knowledge about the mineral riches on 
the ocean floor will help future generations survive.37  
 
The maintenance of maritime sovereignty has been a contentious issue for 
centuries as illustrated by the Pope dividing the whole world between Portugal 
and Spain with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494.38  The protection of 
sovereignty is the duty of the state, and the adoption of the UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) supplied a framework for such protection.  
                                                 
32
 Till, op cit, p 311. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Standing, A.  2007.  The Crisis of Maritime Plunder in Africa, at www.issafrica.org 
35
 Ports & Shipping News.  2008.  No protection available to commercial shipping in Gulf of 
Aden, at http://ports.co.za/news/article_2008_08_10_2602.html  
36
 Till, op cit, pp 321-324. 
37
 Ibid, p 325. 
38
 Ibid, p 327. 
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However, there are still many areas of maritime dispute such as in the South 
China Sea between China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Phillippines, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Brunei.  In protecting the environment, navies can contribute by 
not polluting the oceans, and by providing skills and technical assets for 
research and protection.39  Peace support is inevitably needed in Africa when 
the management of good order at sea is compromised by the exploitation of 
resources, the disruption of transport, a lack of information, threats to maritime 
sovereignty, and endangering of the environment, and the subsequent 
escalation in conflict.  
 
The constabulary role of peacekeeping has evolved considerably since it was 
listed by Grove and therefore the “international constabulary roles developed 
from enforceable and mutually agreed international law and order” need more 
investigation.40  The UN Charter states that the primary purpose of the UN is 
“to maintain international peace and security”,41 and to “safeguard succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”.42  Although there is no explicit 
reference in the UN Charter to either peacekeeping or peace support 
operations, the concepts and principles associated with contemporary peace 
operations have emerged over the last 50 years from the conduct of such 
operations.43  In practice, the 15 member states of the Security Council of the 
UN created and defined peacekeeping operations,44 and Chapters VI, VII and 
VIII of the UN Charter provide the basic frame of reference for such Security 
Council action. 
 
Chapter VIII deals with “regional arrangements” and states in Article 52 
paragraph 1 that “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security”.45  However, no precise 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, pp 329-333. 
40
 Grove, op cit, p 234. 
41
 Malan, M.  1997.  A Concise Conceptual History of UN Peace Operations, in African 
Security Review Vol 6, no 1, at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6No1/Malan.html, p 1. 
42
 Neethling, T.  2002. Peacekeeping in Africa:  Who are the Role-players and What are the 
Challenges?, in Journal for Contemporary History, Vol 27, no 3, p 106. 
43
 Malan, op cit. 
44
 Neethling, op cit. 
45
 UN Charter Chapter VIII.  Available at http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm 
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definition of regional arrangements and agencies is provided.  Article 53 refers 
to enforcement action by regional bodies, but requires that “no enforcement 
action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies 
without the authorisation of the Security Council”.46   
 
Chapter VII deals with actions with “respect to threats to the peace, breaches 
of the peace, and acts of aggression”.47  Chapter VII is essentially concerned 
with coercion and empowers the UN Security Council to investigate alleged 
violations, and then determine measures to be taken against the states 
concerned.48  These measures can include political and economic pressure, 
as well as the use of force.  These broad powers under Article 42 allow the 
Security Council to take such “action by air, sea and land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”.49 
 
Chapter VI deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes and it emphasizes 
the primacy of negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial 
settlement as major mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.50  
No provision is made for unsolicited intervention, but it provides a weak and 
vague basis for the concept and conduct of peace support operations.   
 
Traditional, or classical, peacemaking operations were commonly referred to 
as “Chapter VI and a Half” operations, typically somewhere between Chapter 
VI and VII,51 even though mandated under Chapter VI.  These operations 
were military observer missions, generally assigned to monitor, or to 
supervise cease-fires, truces, or armistice agreements in conflict areas.  
Accordingly naval forces (inclusive of amphibious and naval air forces) have 
been enforcing sanctions and conducting conventional high-intensity 
operations in terms of Chapter VII, for example in Kuwait (1990/91); and 
                                                 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 UN Charter Chapter VII.  Available at http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid.   
50
 UN Charter Chapter VI.  Available at http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm 
51
 Farrell, Theo.  2002.  Human Intervention and Peace Operations, in Baylis, J. et al.  
Strategy in the Contemporary World.  p 288. 
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collecting weapons, monitoring, observing, providing coastguard services, 
mine clearing, and providing safe havens in terms of Chapter VI.   
 
From the above listing of traditional (and more modern) roles, it can be argued 
that there are definite military and non-military roles for navies, and that the 
adaptability, flexibility, mobility and military design of naval forces will ensure 
the execution of various non-military (i.e. diplomatic and constabulary) roles 
during peace-time and in peace support applications.  To confirm this 
statement, and how navies further adapt to what governments require from 
them, the doctrines of navies involved in peace support need to be 
investigated. 
 
3.    NAVAL DOCTRINE COMPARED 
 
In the Royal Navy, the existence of formal doctrine can be traced back to the 
original edition of Fighting Instructions, issued to the Fleet in 1672, and to a 
code of tactical signals promulgated during the Commonwealth in 1653.52  Till 
points out that the British break the fighting power of a military force down into 
three components – the physical component (platforms, weapons), the moral 
component (motivation, leadership, management) and the conceptual 
component.53  The third component is the thought process behind the conduct 
of maritime operations, and doctrine is an important element of this thought 
process.54 The Oxford dictionary defines doctrine as a “body of instruction”, 
and a “set of principles”.55  For the military, doctrine is a set of instructions 
derived from the country‟s military strategy, out of which roles and operations 
can be deduced.  From these definitions, it can be assumed that the foreseen 
roles of navies (and specifically, indicators of roles in peace support) will be 
found in the following investigation of the doctrines of navies.  Apart from the 
doctrines of the United States Navy, the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian 
Navy, the doctrines of the other Western navies involved in peace support 
                                                 
52
 BR 1806 – British Maritime Doctrine.  2
nd
 Ed, p 1. 
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 Till, op cit, p 111. 
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 Ibid. 
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 ed.  Cape Town:  Oxford University Press.   
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could not be accessed, but the roles of the Canadian Navy, the operations of 
the French Navy, and the roles of the Royal New Zealand Navy are thought to 
supply enough information related to the relevant navies‟ doctrines. 
 
3.1.    UNITED STATES NAVAL DOCTRINE 
 
According to the United States Navy (USN) doctrine, the basic roles of the 
naval forces are promoting and defending national interests by maintaining 
maritime superiority, contributing to regional stability, conducting operations 
on and from the sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and 
conducting such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of 
naval campaigns.56  These roles are accomplished through deterrence 
operations and specific peace-time operations, while maintaining fighting 
readiness through continued forward deployed presence, exercising a robust 
sealift capability, and developing interoperability with all Services.57 
 
Under peace-time operations, or operations other than war (OOTW), the USN 
listed participation in peace support operations, conduct of disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance and civil support operations, conducting of 
contingency operations, combating of terrorism, aiding host nations through 
security assistance, assisting other nations in defending themselves, and 
enforcing UN economic sanctions.  Also included is the evacuation of non-
combatant personnel from conflict areas, co-ordination of public health 
operations, and the intercepting of vessels to prevent uncontrolled immigration 
and drug smuggling (in support of other government agencies).58  While the 
US naval forces are trained, organised and equipped to defend the nation and 
its interests, the application of this naval expertise in OOTW missions involves 
many of the wartime capabilities, and is therefore beneficial to enhancing the 
readiness of the naval forces. 
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Subsequent incremental developments in the USN strategy (and roles and 
missions) consisted of documents such as “Forward……from the sea” (1994), 
“The Navy Operational Concept” (January 1997), “Anytime, Anywhere: A 
Navy for the 21st Century” (November 1997), and “Navy Strategic Planning 
Guidance” (2000).59  The latest incremental development is “A Co-operative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (October 2007).60  According to Till, 
navies need to revise their naval strategies in the light of security issues in the 
post-9/11 world, and of the impact of globalisation.61  Till found it significant 
that in the October 2007 revision, firstly, the USN may be signalling a 
willingness to engage in constabulary operations, and secondly, importance is 
attached to humanitarian aid and disaster relief.62  However, these tasks were 
previously listed in the USN doctrine, and therefore the 2007 revision merely 
showed a new emphasis on these tasks (as opposed to new tasks). 
 
3.2.    BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE 
 
In the British Maritime Doctrine textbook (known as BR 1806), the range of 
operations for the British maritime forces is divided into military, constabulary 
and benign operations,63 similar to (but evolved from) the triangle of functions 
of navies as listed by Booth.  However, it is pointed out in BR 1806 that the 
three categories of operations may also fall into the contexts of Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs) and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).  
 
Power projection (from the sea) and sea control (at sea) are listed under the 
military application of maritime power in BR 1806, but the operations included 
under the two headings are different from those listed by Booth or the USN. 
Evacuation operations, naval force in support of diplomacy, and peace 
support operations are included under power projection, while sanctions 
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enforcement, peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations are included under the 
constabulary application of maritime power.  Disaster relief, assistance to 
refugees and peace building operations are included under the benign 
application of maritime power.64  However, these different missions are not 
seen as rigidly classified under the different applications, and benign disaster 
relief may require constabulary or military protection, depending on the scale 
and nature of the threat.65  Similarly, what started off as a constabulary task 
may deteriorate into peace enforcement or evacuation, which are military 
application tasks.  However, it should not be construed that the distinctions in 
the use of military force are arbitrary, because of the different legal basis for 
each of the three uses.  Specific doctrines for each use and distinct attitudes 
of mind from military personnel are required to ensure appropriate action.66  
 
3.3.    ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY DOCTRINE 
 
The RAN doctrine is derived from the Australian Joint Doctrine, and a 
distinction is drawn between combat operations, military support operations 
and shaping activities.67  The span of these maritime operations is explained 
in terms of a triangle of sea usage (similar to that of Booth) with the military 
operations along the base of the triangle and the diplomatic and constabulary 
operations along the two legs of the triangle.  The placing of the military, or 
combat, operations at the base of the triangle is deliberate because the ability 
to carry out combat operations enables the maritime forces to also undertake 
the constabulary and diplomatic operations.68  
 
Military operations are classed as combat operations at sea (such as maritime 
strike and advance force operations), or combat operations from the sea 
(such as amphibious operations and support to operations on land).  Shaping 
operations can be described as naval diplomacy, or the use of maritime forces 
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in support of foreign policy.69  Some of the activities under this heading can be 
constabulary or benign operations, but are diplomatic in intent.  Military 
support operations are made up of constabulary operations and benign 
operations.  Peace operations are included under constabulary operations 
and the major categories are peacekeeping, peace enforcement, embargo 
and sanctions enforcement, and peace building.70  Other lesser categories of 
constabulary operations include defence force aid to civil power (supporting 
domestic law enforcement), environmental and resource management and 
protection, anti-piracy operations, quarantine operations, drug interdiction and 
prevention of illegal immigration.  Benign operations include evacuation, 
defence assistance to the civil community, search and rescue, disaster relief 
and defence force assistance to allied and friendly nations.71  
 
3.4.    CANADIAN NAVY ROLES 
 
The Leadmark model offered the roles of the Canadian Navy in terms of a 
refinement of the Booth and Grove models.72  The roles are divided into 
military, diplomatic and constabulary roles, and the functions of the military 
role are command of the sea, sea control, sea denial, battlespace dominance, 
fleet in being, maritime power projection, and maritime manoeuvre.73  The 
functions of the constabulary role are in support of the Canadian Coast Guard, 
and are sovereign patrols, aid of the civil power, assistance to other 
government departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, and oceans 
management.   
 
The functions of the diplomatic role are listed under the broad categories of 
Naval Diplomacy and Crisis Management, and are preventative deployments, 
coercion, maritime interdiction operations, peace support operations, non-
combatant evacuation operations, civil military co-operation, symbolic use (to 
signal a message), presence, humanitarian assistance, confidence building 
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measures, and Track Two Diplomacy (which is interaction with people from 
adversarial groups or nations, like academic conferences).74  The peace 
support operations are defined as assistance to diplomatic and humanitarian 
activities in order to achieve a long-term political settlement, and include 
preventative diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, 
and post-conflict peace-building.75 
 
In an update to the Leadmark model, it is noted that, while the 9/11 attacks led 
to a renewed emphasis on Canada‟s domestic maritime security, the number 
of flashpoints where the Canadian Navy can contribute to the Canadian 
government‟s international engagement policy is increasing.76  Hence, the 
notion that Canada is made more secure by enabling the resolution of global 
problems at their source (called forward security), will encompass options 
from dispatching naval forces to demonstrate concern over a developing 
situation, to participating in naval peace-keeping in disputed waters, to the 
suppression of piracy along international sea-lanes, and to the enforcement of 
sanctions against rogue states.77  These are not new missions to the 
Canadian Navy, but these missions are gaining new prominence. 
   
3.5.    FRENCH NAVY OPERATIONS 
 
The changed strategic environment due to the 9/11 attacks demanded the 
defence of the French nation‟s vital interests and action as fast as possible, 
mostly in joint and European frameworks.78  The contributions of the French 
Navy (Marine Nationale) revolve around operational functions derived from 
four strategic functions, namely the deterrence, protection, prevention and 
projection functions.  While deterrence is the cornerstone of French defence 
strategy (thereby guaranteeing the protection of vital French interests), 
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operational action consists of prevention missions (to stop the development of 
conflict or crisis situations) and force projection missions.79  Prevention 
consists of exerting a watchful presence to collect intelligence on potential 
crises, and when prevention cannot stop crises from escalating, direct 
intervention with a carrier battle group (for assault or force demonstration), or 
an amphibious group (for deploying forces or aiding populations in disaster-
affected areas)  can be carried out.  Maritime safeguard guarantees the 
protection of the French territory from the sea, and is the overarching 
framework for operations carried out by the French Navy to face any potential 
threats from the sea (like terrorism, narco-trafficking, piracy, illegal transport of 
migrants), and to defend sovereign rights at sea.80  
 
The reforms of the 2003-2008 Military Programming Law transformed the 
Marine Nationale into a more task-based organisation.81  Focus on 
safeguarding France‟s naval approaches was increased by assuming a 
maritime protection role further out to sea in order to fight terrorists, drug-
traffickers and illegal immigrants.  A bigger emphasis was placed on joint and 
combined operations with friends and allies, particularly in crises management 
and peace support operations.82 
 
3.6.    ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY ROLES 
 
The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) is one of the smaller navies in the 
world, and its roles are defined as the maritime element of the Royal New 
Zealand Defence Force‟s (RNZDF) missions.  The RNZDF strives to secure 
New Zealand, including its people, land, territorial waters, exclusive economic 
zone, natural resources and critical infrastructure83.  The RNZDF is also 
tasked with reducing the risks from global and regional insecurity, and with 
advancing New Zealand‟s values and interests through participation in 
regional and international security systems.    
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For the RNZN, this translated to having a presence in overseas waters, 
assisting in redevelopment in troubled countries, participating in peacekeeping 
and peacemaking, and supporting land-based operations.  The RNZN is also 
tasked by other government agencies, resulting in patrolling the EEZ, 
transport to offshore islands, supporting the New Zealand Customs Service, 
and producing hydrographic information.84 
 
Therefore the doctrines of the various navies indicate the roles and operations 
that are envisaged to be undertaken, and all these navies envisage the 
inclusion of peace support activities.  Some actual past involvement of these 
navies in peace support activities will now be listed to confirm that the 
anticipated roles and operations were carried out in accordance with the 
visions. 
 
4.    PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT  
 
Naval units have not been prominent in traditional peacekeeping roles, 
primarily because the origins of internationally significant disputes are 
predominantly land-based.85  It was previously not obvious that ocean 
boundary issues can lead to disputes which, in turn, can deteriorate into 
conflicts.  Differences at sea did not attract the political symbolism and 
popular levels of emotion which interfere with peaceful resolution processes86 
(even though the present piracy activities off Somalia may have changed this 
line of thinking).  Therefore maritime forces have mostly been used to assist 
with peace support activities on land, and navies have supported and supplied 
land-based peacekeepers in order to help defuse or stabilise situations, and 
monitor the implementations. 
 
The first UN naval peacekeeping operation rendered assistance to the 
mediation process in Palestine in 1948.  The ships involved were from the 
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USA and France, and they patrolled the coast, transported personnel and 
supplies, but were not allowed to use force to stop and board vessels.87  More 
recently, 36-ton Argentinian patrol boats patrolled the Gulf of Fonseca near 
Nicaragua in 1990 to gather information on the movements of ships and craft 
in the area for the UN headquarters (who were trying to find the gun-
smuggling routes).  These boats‟ crews did not have the right to stop and 
inspect shipping, but when the operation ended in January 1992, it was 
claimed that the naval patrols discouraged gunrunners by their permanent 
presence.88  This was thus one of the first examples of a peace support 
operation, because the role of the patrol boats was to take measures in the 
prevention of threats to peace.   
 
The tasks of the UN riverine and coastal patrols in Cambodia from early 1992 
to the end of 1993 were to transport personnel and equipment, to supervise 
the ceasefire and investigate allegations of foreign military presence, to 
monitor the demobilisation of naval forces, and to deter and intercept arms 
smuggling.89  Again this can be seen as an example of a peace support 
operation because the aim was the prevention of threats to peace.  However, 
riverine patrols are different from patrols at sea because of the legal 
implications of action to be taken in territorial waters (or on the high seas), 
compared to action on inland waters where the borders are more clearly 
defined.   
 
Indications that naval monitoring and verification moved from peacekeeping to 
enforcement, were visible in the hostile behaviour of Serbian military units 
towards NATO and WEU task groups monitoring sanctions in the Adriatic Sea 
in 1992/3.  At the same time, aircraft carriers from the UK, USA and France 
(under national operational control) sustained and supported UN Protection 
Forces in Croatia and Bosnia, serving as sovereign base areas, and standing 
by for evacuation.  However, they also provided air cover to enforce no-fly 
zones, and thereby engaged in peace enforcement as opposed to 
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peacekeeping90 (due to an ongoing peace enforcement mission on land in the 
Balkans).   
 
Apart from peacekeeping and peace enforcement, navies have also 
contributed to the enforcement of sanctions, as in the deployment of the 
RAN‟s HMAS MELBOURNE to the Persian Gulf in 1999 in support of the UN-
mandated sanctions against Iraq.91  In another application, the RNZN, apart 
from also sending a frigate to the Persian Gulf, supplied the HMZS 
ENDEAVOUR as a site for peace talks between Papua New Guinea and 
Bougainville.92  Many examples exist of disaster relief and humanitarian aid 
operations, such as Operation TELLAR where the RN sent ships, helicopters 
and personnel to Honduras and Nicaragua to supply humanitarian relief after 
Hurricane Mitch caused disruption and loss of life in 1998.93  These peace 
support activities are in line with the envisaged roles for navies, even though 
only a few examples have been listed.   
 
Focussing on Africa, there have not been many peace support activities 
where naval units were involved.  In August 1990, an Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) task group 
assisted a landing of forces in Monrovia,94 Liberia, to oppose the forces of 
Charles Taylor after he ousted the elected government.  The task group 
consisted of two corvettes, a fast attack craft, a tug and an oil tanker from 
Nigeria, and two fast attack craft and a merchant ship from Ghana.95  The 
tasks executed by the group included sealift, coastal patrolling to prevent 
arms importation, a blockade of Buchanan Port, civilian and military 
evacuation, port control, and communications between ECOMOG and the 
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outside world.96  While the landing was successful, the ECOMOG operations 
suffered from excessive control by home governments, different training 
standards, doctrine and staff procedures, and poor sea lift capabilities.97  
Despite these limitations, the peace support tasks executed by the ECOMOG 
naval task group compare well with the doctrines and tasks executed by those 
Western navies already listed (to suppress of acts of aggression or breaches 
of peace). 
 
Another interesting peace support deployment by a naval unit off the African 
coast was the assistance given by the Canadian naval replenishment ship 
HMCS PRESERVER towards UNITAF, the UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force 
in Somalia in December 1992.98  The ship functioned as a joint command and 
control platform to assist the joint forces ashore in setting up operations.99  At 
the same time, the Canadian ship also performed duties as a floating logistics, 
medical and support base, an operating base for helicopters, and a floating 
centre for technical repair and support.  Apart from the joint headquarters role, 
HMCS PRESERVER also supplied humanitarian aid ashore, provided medical 
and dental care, repaired equipment and assisted with the building of an 
orphanage in Mogadishu.100   
 
The USN participation in peace support activities off the African coast has 
been similar to the aid operations of the Canadian Navy, but more extensive 
and varied.  The West African Training Cruise (WATC) and the African 
Partnership Station (APS) are two of the peace support activities organised by 
the USN which can be described as confidence-building measures.  The 
WATC is a co-operative maritime exercise that includes port visits by the 
USN, aiming to further the USN‟s working relationships with African navies 
and allowing for unique training and exercising to the benefit of the 
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participating maritime forces.101  The APS activities consist of joint exercises, 
port visits, professional training and community outreach with the nations of 
West and Central Africa.  The activities focus on building the maritime 
capacity of these African nations and increasing the level of co-operation 
between them to improve maritime safety and security.  It is hoped that these 
activities will improve the abilities of the nations involved, to extend the rule of 
law out to sea, and better combat illegal fishing, drug smuggling, human 
trafficking, oil theft and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.102   
 
However, it is off the coast of Somalia where piracy is currently threatening 
the continuation of good order at sea.  According to Article 101 of UNCLOS,103 
piracy is a criminal act, which is carried out on the high seas.104  The 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that there had been an 
unprecedented rise in pirate attacks during the first nine months of 2008, with 
Somalia and Nigeria being the first and second ranked piracy hotspots.105  
These attacks in the Gulf of Aden (an international seaway) against different 
kinds of commercial ships have been violent, with hostages taken, and 
ransoms demanded.106  The attacks represent a threat to commercial 
shipping, and therefore a threat to the peaceful use of the sea as a medium of 
transportation; hence the suppression of these acts of piracy is a naval peace 
support function,107 since action is being taken against acts of aggression 
which are a threat to peace. 
 
Naval forces deployed to counter pirate attacks off the Somalian coast include 
ships from the EU, NATO and Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150).  CTF-
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150 was initially set up under the US-led war in Afghanistan to patrol (and 
monitor, inspect, board and stop suspect shipping in) the Persian Gulf, the 
Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.108 It was diverted earlier in 2008 to 
concentrate almost solely on fighting piracy.109  Naval units from NATO have 
been escorting UN World Food Programme (UNWFP) ships, loaded with food 
for those starving in Somalia, safely to Mogadishu.110  On 10 November 2008, 
the EU launched Operation Atalanta, its first-ever naval mission, to assist 
Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 of the UN Security Council (UNSC), with 
the aim of protecting vessels of the UNWFP and other vulnerable vessels, as 
well as of deterring, preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast.111  The UNSC resolutions (under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter) called for states interested in the security of maritime 
activities to deploy naval vessels and military aircraft to suppress acts of 
piracy on the high seas and airspace off the coast of Somalia in a manner 
consistent with UNCLOS.112  
 
The piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea have not reached the same 
intensity and scale of those off the Somali coast, but on one occasion, an 
offshore oil platform was attacked 75 miles into the Gulf.113  On another 
occasion, a French oil supply vessel was seized off Cameroon and the crew 
members were held hostage114. 
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Although not exhaustive, the above listing reflects the participation and the 
possibilities for participation by naval units in peace support activities, and 
more specifically, off the African coast.  The SAN has been involved in at least 
one peace support task off the African coast, but that will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  Lastly, only one example of naval peace support activities in the 
interior of Africa by foreign forces could be found.  Uruguay accepted 
command of the eastern sector of MONUC (French abbreviation for the “UN 
Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo”) and deployed a first-ever 
riverine unit to patrol the vast waterways in that part of the country.115  The 
roles of navies in peace support activities, and specifically those applicable to 
Africa, can now be summarised and concluded. 
 
5.    CONCLUSION 
 
There are definite military and non-military roles for navies, and the 
adaptability, flexibility, mobility and military design of naval forces will ensure 
the execution of various non-military (i.e. diplomatic and constabulary) roles 
during peace-time and in peace support applications. 
 
To confirm the interface between the military and non-military roles listed by 
the UN and the naval actions, the doctrines of navies, and specifically those 
involved in peace support operations, were investigated.  It was shown that 
the roles emanating and evolving from the traditional roles for navies have 
thus been assimilated into naval doctrines, roles and tasks.  From examples 
of actual naval peace support tasks by selected navies, it was shown that 
such tasks were effective in preventing threats to peace.    
 
From these traditional naval roles and doctrines, and actual examples of 
peace support activities by navies, and particularly in Africa, the potential 
contributions of the SAN can include patrols to stop smuggling, riverine patrols 
to monitor security, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, sealift, acting as a 
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floating base, training and community outreach.  However, the history and 
future expectations of the SAN must first be investigated.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY:  HISTORY AND POTENTIAL 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African Navy (SAN) was created after the First World War as an 
indigenous naval capability for South Africa was deemed necessary.  Its roles 
and responsibilities changed through the years and depended on both the 
requirements of the state, and the political realities of the time.  Possible 
future roles in peace support would depend on political requirements as well 
as the capabilities and composition of the SAN in the short to medium term.  
In order to understand how the current SAN came about and how it acquired 
its current structure and organisation, it is necessary to provide a brief 
overview of its history and experience.  Furthermore, as its current philosophy 
will determine the possible contributions by the SAN with regard to peace 
support activities, the guidelines provided by the SAN doctrine must be taken 
into account.   
 
Bigger navies (like the US Navy) can execute a variety of roles during 
peacetime because of their size. The size of the SAN is limiting its capacity, 
and therefore its comparison to other navies will enhance an appreciation for 
the possible contributions from the SAN.  The aim is then to analyse the 
history, the comparative size and the maritime doctrine of the SAN, the 
expectations of organisations like SADC and the AU, and the initiatives 
discussed at maritime security forums, in order to understand the future 
contributions the SAN can make in peace support activities.   
 
2.    A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY 
 
The acquisition of three ships to form the nucleus of its own navy for South 
Africa stemmed from decisions at an Imperial Conference held in London in 
early 1921.  Instead of the annual financial contribution by South Africa to the 
Royal Navy (RN), it was agreed that South Africa would 
 
 39 
 undertake responsibility for the hydrographic survey of the Union 
of South Africa‟s waters; 
 commence with the formation of the nucleus of a sea-going 
naval Permanent Force; 
 bear the cost of certain development works in the East Dockyard 
in Simon‟s Town; and  
 expand the South African Division of the Royal Naval Voluntary 
Reserve (RNVR) to provide the men necessary for the local 
defence flotillas and similar reserves.1   
 
The three ships were commissioned on 1 April 1922, and the South African 
Naval Service (SANS) was established as a unit of the South African 
Permanent Force (then known as the Union Defence Force (UDF)) from 1 
February 1923.2  The role of the UDF (according to the South African 
Defence Act No 13 of 1922) was the defence of the Union in any part of 
southern Africa, inside or outside the Union.3  However, due to the economic 
depression and the resultant budget cuts, the Union government paid off the 
ships by 1934.  The SANS was reduced to an organisation consisting of four 
officers, 12 ratings and 10 civilian staff, with the tasks to administer and train 
the RNVR(SA), and to continue the hydrographic survey of South African 
waters.4    
 
After the start of the Second World War (WW II), the South African 
Government decided in September 1939 that it was necessary that the Union 
Forces should accept full responsibility for certain services in connection with 
the Union ports and coastline.5  The new force was to be called the South 
African Seaward Defence Force (SDF) and consist of both Permanent and 
Active Citizen Force units.  The SDF was renamed in the Government 
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Gazette of 1 August 1942 as the South African Naval Forces (SANF).  During 
the war the SANF expanded from an organisation with five personnel and no 
ships, to a force with 89 ships and 10 332 personnel at the end of the war.  
The South African naval vessels served in South African waters and in the 
Mediterranean, while South African naval personnel served in most theatres 
of the war.6  As no custom-built warships were available, initial South African 
naval vessels consisted of ships taken up from trade and adopted for wartime 
service.  These included nine trawlers and 49 whalers (converted and utilised 
as anti-submarine warfare vessels and minesweepers), three boom defence 
vessels, one salvage vessel, one controlled minelayer, three examination 
vessels and eleven harbour defence motor launches.7  It was only at the end 
of the war that the South African naval establishment received its first custom-
built frigates - the three Loch-class frigates.8  
 
After the end of the war, the SANF was initially reduced to six ships (the three 
frigates, two boom defence vessels and the minelayer) and eleven motor 
launches.9  The Loch-class frigates were put to good use with the annexing of 
Marion and Prince Edward islands for South Africa in 1947, and flag-showing 
visits to East and West African ports in 1948.10  However, Simon‟s Town was 
strategically important against the background of the developing Cold War 
and was situated on the alternative sea route to the Suez Canal (especially in 
the light of the developing Middle East conflicts).11  Therefore the naval 
situation in South Africa was bound to change, and the catalyst was the 
changing political environment in the country from 1948.  By 1954, the RN and 
the South African Navy (SAN - the name changed in 1951) saw the role of the 
SAN as that of being in assistance to the RN in the protection of the Cape 
Sea Route, being the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the 
resources of the east and Europe.12  This view, the success of the German U-
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boats off the South African coast during WWII and the Simon‟s Town 
Agreement supplied the reasoning behind the SAN‟s acquisition of ships13 
after the transfer of the Simon‟s Town Naval Base from the RN to the SAN in 
1957.  In short, the Simon‟s Town Agreement dealt with South Africa 
assuming control over Simon‟s Town naval base, while the Royal Navy 
retained the use of the naval base‟s facilities in peace and in war.14  The 
Agreement on Defence of the Sea Routes round Southern Africa (as part of 
the Simon‟s Town Agreement) stipulated that the SAN would purchase six 
anti-submarine frigates (only three delivered due to cost escalation), ten 
coastal minesweepers and four seaward defence boats (five delivered).15  
However, Bennett saw the acquisitions as the result of the Government 
yielding to diplomatic pressure from the British Government (who needed to 
employ ship-construction workers after the war), and not from an 
understanding of a maritime strategy.16  
 
The stance of the world towards the politics of the Republic of South Africa in 
the early 1960s led to foreign ports being closed to the SAN, which made it 
difficult to obtain fuel for long cruises.  It also became clear that the so-called 
Great Powers (like the USA and the UK) would not assist in case of a 
seaward attack on South Africa, and these two realities guided the SAN to the 
acquisition of a replenishment vessel and three submarines in 1967.17  Since 
the frigates were getting older, the requirement to upgrade the fleet was 
becoming urgent, and when the acquisition project from Portugal was 
cancelled for various reasons in 1974, the Minister of Defence opened 
negotiations with Israel in the same year to acquire strike craft.18  After the 
cancellation of the Simon‟s Town Agreement in 1975, there would be no 
further British naval presence in South Africa, or any British assistance in the 
acquisition of future naval ships.19 This, and the institution of the UN Arms 
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Embargo against South Africa in 1977, meant that the ageing frigates could 
not be replaced by acquisitions from France.20 The strike craft now fitted into 
the view of the South African Defence Force (SADF) Headquarters staff that 
the role of the SAN had changed from the protection of the Cape Sea Route, 
to monitoring, controlling and protecting the interests of South Africa’s 
territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), deterrence of any 
maritime aggression against South Africa, and supporting the objectives 
of land operations.21  Bennett argued that, while the strike craft proved to be 
extremely effective and useful additions to the SAN, the Naval Staff (as 
opposed to the SADF headquarters staff) still believed in 1977 that the SAN 
was the custodian of the Cape Sea Route.22  Mills and Edmonds noticed the 
same sentiment in the SA Defence White Papers of 1977 and 1979, and 
attributed it to the Cold War geo-strategic thinking.23  
 
The period of military isolation from the 1960s began with the UN adopting 
restrictive resolutions regarding the sale of arms to South Africa in 1963, the 
ceasing of sales of weapons by the UK Government in 1964, the closure of 
the Royal Navy‟s Southern Atlantic Headquarters in Cape Town, and the 
subsequent withdrawal of the last British frigate from South Africa in 1967.24  
Foreign contact by SAN ships became limited with a last visit to Australia in 
1968, the last official visit to a Portuguese possession in Africa (Lourenco 
Marques – now Maputo) in 1973 by two frigates and a submarine, and the last 
exercise with the Royal Navy in 1974.25  There was also the only visit to North 
America with the participation in the bicentennial celebrations of the US in 
New York in 1976, and the first visit to Argentina in 1967 by two frigates and a 
supply ship.26   
 
SAN ships also acted in support of the South African landward forces involved 
in the combating of insurgents in the northern Namibian border region and in 
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Angola.27  At least one of two frigates and a supply ship were at all times on 
patrol along the Angolan coast from October 1975 to January 1976 during 
Operation Savannah, while a submarine was also deployed in the same 
area.28  This marginal role (in military strategic terms) by SAN ships in the 
Angolan war included assistance in clandestine military operations (by being 
on standby to extract SADF forces and to supply naval gunfire support to 
SADF forces if required) and the landing of reconnaissance teams.29   
 
Flag-showing opportunities included the visit by the SAN survey ship to 
Uruguay as guardship for the transatlantic yacht race in 1979, a visit to 
Mauritius by a strike craft and a supply ship while searching for the missing 
South African Airways aircraft (Helderberg) in 1987-88, and a visit to Chile by 
two SAN ships to transport South African defence equipment to the FIDE ‟88 
international air show in 1988.30  During the isolation period, South Africa had 
good relations with Taiwan, which resulted in the Taiwanese Navy visiting 
South Africa in 1981, 1985, 1989 and 1992, and two strike craft and a supply 
ship visiting Taiwan in 1990.31   
 
An interesting development in the SAN force structure during 1979 was the 
creation of the Marines.  The SA Corps of Marines was formed in 1951 to man 
the coastal and anti-aircraft artillery, but was disbanded in 1955 when the 
coastal artillery became obsolete.32  The role of the Marine branch created in 
the SAN in 1979 was to protect South African harbours against attacks from 
land and from the sea.  However, the Marines also patrolled the Zambezi, 
served in an infantry role on the Border until 1988, were employed in counter-
insurgency operations in the South African townships in support of the SA 
Army, and demonstrated their ability to carry out amphibious landings near 
Walvis Bay in 1988.  Due to budget cutbacks and the need for a new ship 
acquisition program, the SAN disbanded the Marines in 1989.33  
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The specification for new ships, formulated in the Naval Staff Requirement 6 
(NSR 6) of 1980, mentioned corvette-sized vessels,34 and this was in line with 
Defence White Papers of 1977 and 1979, and the thinking of the Naval Staff 
at the time (as mentioned earlier).  Earlier projects to acquire such vessels for 
the SAN failed mainly because of the international embargo against South 
Africa, and the high cost of such vessels.35  These reasons continued to 
bolster the argument against the acquisition of new corvette-sized ships for 
the SAN through the 1980s and the early 1990s, but NSR 6 was reworked to 
specify a bigger vessel because of the operational experience gained from 
using the strike craft.36  The requirement for corvettes was repeated in the 
recommendations of the Defence Review in 1998,37 after the White Paper on 
Defence in 1996 called for a “core force”.38  The Defence Review also 
recommended the acquisition of submarines to replace the old submarines.  
When the Strategic Defence Package (SDP - which included the purchase of 
four corvettes and three submarines)39 was signed in December 1999, it was 
in line with naval thought over a number of years (i.e. to obtain ships for the 
control of South African SLOCs), and also in line with what was recommended 
and accepted in Government circles at the time. 
 
Moving from origin and acquisition history to the recent history of the SAN, 
operations in a diplomatic role will be listed in order to highlight the 
capabilities and role of the SAN in peacetime.  The visit by the replenishment 
ship, SAS Drakensberg, and two strike craft in 1990 to Taiwan strengthened 
diplomatic ties with this Far East country.40  The visit by the same 
replenishment ship and two mine hunters to the Republic of Zaire (as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was then known) strengthened the 
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diplomatic ties with an African country.41  A good example of the SAN‟s early 
involvement in a peace support activity was the visit of the replenishment ship, 
SAS Outeniqua, to Zaire in order to supply the services required by President 
Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki in their initiative to bring peace and 
stability to the former Zaire.  After Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila 
arrived on board, the ship moved into international waters to facilitate 
neutrality – a requirement from both Sese Seko and Kabila42.   
 
In terms of inter-departmental co-operation, assistance to the Department 
of Environmental Affairs‟ (DEA) Antarctic mission was given regularly, with the 
SAS Drakensberg supplying victuals and fuel to the SA Agulhas for an 
extended stay in January 1991,43 and the same ship towing the SA Agulhas 
from the Antarctic (and supplying the German ship Polarstern) in February 
1992.44  The hydrographic ship, SAS Protea, assisted the DEA in Antarctica 
by transporting a group of scientists to the SA Agulhas in January 1993,45 and 
exchanging the SA Air Force crew at the South African research base in 
Antarctica in January 1994.46  The SAS Protea also assisted the Australian 
Navy and civil fisheries by intercepting the South Tommy for illegal fishing.47  
 
Humanitarian assistance during emergencies was given by the SAN after 
the floods in Natal in 1987,48 during the foundering of the Greek pleasure 
cruiser, Oceanos, in August 1991,49 and when SAN divers retrieved bodies 
from a capsized Tanzanian ferry on Lake Victoria in 1996.50  Relief-aid was 
supplied by SAS Drakensberg in July 1991 to Bangladesh, Turkey and 
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Mozambique,51 and by the other replenishment ship, SAS Tafelberg, in 
September 1992 to Somali refugees in Kenya in Operation Flush/Big Tree.52 
 
However, since SAS Outeniqua’s involvement in Zaire in 1997, the SAN has 
only contributed to peace support by way of the patrols carried out by the SAN 
Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika in Burundi, and assistance 
from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi.53   
 
This abbreviated history of the SAN focused on the reasons for its existence 
and growth, the earlier acquisitions of ships which would execute some 
operations under the roles required, and examples of other operations carried 
out under peacetime and wartime roles.  The primary reasoning behind the 
existence of the acquisitions for the SAN seemed to have been (for most of 
the time) the protection of the SLOCs around the South African coast in 
wartime.  This reasoning allowed the SAN to execute other peacetime duties 
(when the capabilities acquired were not required for wartime duties).  The 
rank of the SAN in relation to navies around the world must now be 
investigated in order to establish if the roles (and the operations) expected of 
the SAN are commensurate to its size. 
 
3.    COMPARATIVE SIZE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY 
 
Ranking navies in terms of power and capability was difficult because different 
factors like types of forces deployed, the sophistication of their equipment, 
level of afloat support, and the numbers of vessels had to be taken into 
account.54  To make this ranking easier, navies which could exert force at sea 
would be ranked, and force projection would imply the capacity to engage in 
sea control, sea denial and power projection.55  After the somewhat dated 
ranking from Grove, the more modern ranking from Till will be discussed. 
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Grove divided navies into nine different categories of navies,56 with the Major 
Global Force Projection Navy (Complete) being the first rank.  A navy in 
this rank would be capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces 
on a global scale.  By implication, this capability would also enable this navy 
to carry out diplomatic and constabulary roles (as discussed earlier).  At 
present, only the US Navy could be ranked this high.  Fifthly ranked was the 
Adjacent Force Projection Navy, which possessed some ability to project 
force well offshore, but was not capable of carrying out high-level naval 
operations over oceanic distances.57  Grove included Portugal, Greece, Israel 
and South Africa in this ranking,58 and while he did not refer specifically to the 
ability of these navies to carry out peace support activities, “projecting force 
well offshore” could be interpreted as such.  Ranked ninth was the Token 
Navy, which had a formal organisational structure, a few coastal craft and 
could carry out the most limited constabulary functions.59  The navies of 
Angola and Western Samoa fitted this rank. 
 
Till ranked navies in three notional models of naval development, namely 
modern, post-modern and pre-modern navies60 and attributed the 
development to the effect of globalisation on countries and the subsequent 
effect on their navies.  He cautioned that none of the terms were value 
judgements, implying that one was better or worse than the other, and that 
they were not mutually exclusive absolutes.  Modern navies adapted to the 
traditional or conventional concepts of naval employment to contemporary 
circumstances, while post-modern navies transformed into something else in 
some or in all respects.  Adverse circumstances forced pre-modern navies 
into a struggle to exist or to do anything other than to symbolise their country 
and its problems, and could perhaps at best supply a sporadic defence of 
some of its key interests.61  The missions of a post-modern navy would be the 
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sea control, expeditionary operations, the maintenance of good order at sea 
and the maintenance of a maritime consensus (i.e. maritime co-operation).  
Modern navies would have the same missions, but would tend towards the 
narrower interpretation of the different concepts, and would prefer a balanced 
fleet for the execution of the missions with national defence/interest perhaps 
more salient.  The post-modern fleet would be a specialised, contributory fleet 
(i.e. a collective maritime effort), a characteristic which would be more evident 
in the case of smaller navies influenced by resource constraints.62       
 
The ranking of some of the navies mentioned in Grove‟s typology could be 
debated, but it is the range of peace support activities carried out by the 
navies ranked above and alongside the SAN which could give an indication of 
what the SAN may be able to contribute. The navies ranked alongside the 
SAN have also changed somewhat since Grove‟s typology was written (as 
has the SAN).  In 2008, the Greek Navy possessed nine submarines, fourteen 
frigates and eighteen fast attack craft,63 the Israeli Navy three submarines, 
three frigates and ten fast attack craft,64 and the Portuguese Navy one 
submarine, four frigates and seven corvettes.65   
 
While the Israeli Navy had been defending the Israeli coast and its sea 
lanes,66 Greece had sent a frigate to participate in Operation Atalanta, (the 
European naval campaign to stop piracy off the Somali coast),67 and the 
Portuguese Navy supplied a frigate in support of Combined Task Force 150.68  
It has been shown that the Greek Navy had many more ships than the SAN, 
and the Portuguese Navy was somewhat superior to the SAN in numbers of 
ships.  It was acknowledged that the Greek and Portuguese navies were part 
of a EU/NATO group which supplied them with operational and logistic 
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support when operating far from home.  Still, two navies, similar in rank to the 
SAN, were actively involved in peace support activities, and therefore the SAN 
could theoretically supply a ship for similar peace support activities if the 
operational and logistical support requirements could be satisfied.  This could 
be part of a collective maritime effort, as described by Till in the missions of 
post-modern navies.  The planned roles (and peace support activities) of the 
SAN must now be investigated as they were captured in the Maritime Doctrine 
of the SAN. 
 
4.    MARITIME DOCTRINE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY 
 
The Maritime Doctrine of the SAN took its direct lead from the SANDF Military 
Strategy, which in turn was based on the White Paper on Defence, and the 
Constitution of South Africa.69  The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa determined that “the primary object of the defence force is to defend 
and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity, and its people in accordance 
with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use 
of force”.70   
 
The White Paper on Defence states that the primary role of the SANDF is to 
defend South Africa against external military aggression, and that the SANDF 
shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military 
force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.71  It also states 
that South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace 
support operations.72  This statement was further reinforced by the White 
Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions 1998, 
which stated that the South African involvement in peace missions could 
range from involvement in the broader diplomatic and political initiatives to 
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those missions with a more reactive focus.73  The South African Defence 
Review 1998 confirmed the country‟s commitment to the development of 
common security which can facilitate sharing of information and resources, 
early warning of potential crises, implementing confidence-building measures, 
and resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful means.74   
 
With this primary guidance from the Constitution and the White Papers, the 
mission-based SANDF Military Strategy was compiled in 2001.  The military 
strategic objectives to be achieved were identified in the Military Strategy as 
follows: enhancing and maintaining comprehensive defence capabilities, 
promoting peace, security and stability in the Region and the Continent, 
and supporting the people of South Africa.75 
 
The SAN will be able to defend South Africa against external aggression if it 
achieves the objective of enhancing and maintaining comprehensive 
defence capabilities.  The missions envisaged in terms of this objective (as 
derived from the SANDF missions) were identified as:  
 operations against enemy forces;  
 protection of maritime trade (including naval co-ordination and 
guidance of shipping);  
 combat operations against land forces;  
 combat operations in support of and the defence of land forces; combat 
and non-combat evacuation operations; and  
 combat search and rescue.76   
 
To achieve the objective of promoting peace, security and stability in the 
region and continent, the SAN will engage in co-operative ventures with 
counterparts throughout the region such as combined exercises, exchange 
visits, and training and education.77  The missions (as derived from the 
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SANDF missions) to be undertaken in the achievement of this objective, will 
be conducted outside the territorial waters of South Africa.  These missions 
are: embargoes, sanctions, blockade and quarantine enforcement, peace 
support operations, anti-piracy operations, drug interdiction, anti-contraband 
operations, maritime counter terrorism, and support to counter insurgency 
operations.78  More missions for the same objective are:  fishery protection, 
enforcement of maritime agreements, and riverine and lake patrols.79  
 
The objective of providing support to the people of South Africa will be 
achieved by the SAN playing an active role within the internal South African 
maritime sector.80  Most of the missions required to achieve this objective will 
be in support of other government departments where they will be the leading 
department.  The missions (as derived from the SANDF missions) were 
identified as:  humanitarian aid and disaster relief, border safeguarding, 
search and rescue, hydrographic surveying and support to other government 
departments.81 
 
The peace support activities which the SAN could then theoretically be 
tasked to execute, would be covered by those missions identified under the 
objectives of promoting peace, security and stability in the region and the 
continent, and providing support to the people of South Africa.  The 
hierarchical structure of the development of the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN 
ensured that the expectations of the government of the day were incorporated 
in the missions of the doctrine.  From the brief history and the comparative 
size of the SAN, it could be stated that the objective of providing support to 
the people of South Africa had been proven.  The ability to achieve the 
objective of promoting peace, security and stability in the region and continent 
had not been proven (except for executing lake patrols), but size-wise, the 
SAN could be expected to carry out peace support activities providing proper 
planning was done and support is available.  International expectations for 
South African participation have been made clear in the request from the 
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World Food Programme to South Africa to escort emergency aid shipments to 
Somalia.82  However, for the achievement of the objective, the expectations of 
the South African sub-region and the continent must be investigated to 
determine if the expectations of both parties are aligned. 
 
5.    REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL EXPECTATIONS  
 
Some regional and sub-regional expectations were articulated by the Standing 
Maritime Committee (SMC) and at maritime conferences held around the 
continent (regional referring to “the African continental area” and sub-regional 
referring to “geographical groupings on the African continent like SADC and 
ECOWAS”).  South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation (OPDSC) was established in 2001 to promote peace and security in 
the region.83  One of the sub-committees under the OPDSC is the Interstate 
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) with, as members, the Ministers of 
Defence, Public Security and State Security of the SADC countries, and one 
of the sub-committees under the ISDSC is the Defence Sub-Committee.84  
Under the Defence Sub-Committee are various workgroups and standing 
committees, such as the SMC, which produced a common doctrine for the 
Multi-National Marine forces of SADC (when engaged in peace support 
operations in the future).85  
 
In SADC MPSO 1A, it is stated that the common doctrine for Officers 
Commanding SADC maritime forces in peace support operations (PSOs) 
is authoritative, but not prescriptive, and aims to serve as an aide memoire.86  
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Similarly to the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN, this publication discusses 
possible missions for SADC to achieve a required end state.  SADC MPSO 
1A states that maritime involvement in PSOs may involve supporting sealift, 
surfaces forces (often with organic aircraft for coastal surveillance operations), 
submarine forces, amphibious forces, or provision of individual observers.  In 
order to be effective, maritime forces should have access to the territorial 
waters adjacent to the parties to the conflict (i.e. localised sea control), and 
should offer a staging platform for personnel and equipment destined for 
shore duty, and for sustaining the force ashore.87  Furthermore, the 
accompanying of neutral shipping in and out of a danger area, the providing  
of neutral territory onboard ships for peace negotiations, close and continuous 
observation of selected areas by sea and air surveillance, coastal control to 
ensure unimpeded use of an offshore area, harbour defence and port security, 
mine countermeasures, and search and rescue are missions that SADC 
maritime forces may be required to execute.88  In the publication it is also 
realised that interoperability at many levels, shared doctrine, common tactical 
picture, and training towards safe seamanship and helicopter operations, are 
essential to the success of a multi-national operation.89 
 
The missions listed in the SADC maritime doctrine focused on operations, but 
many other options for peace support activities have been put forward at 
various conferences and symposia in Africa.  At the South African Navy and 
African Renaissance Conference in Simon‟s Town in 1997, Simpson-
Anderson (then the Chief of the SAN) suggested that the SAN could 
contribute SAN expertise, hydrographic survey services, assistance to 
maritime resource protection, search and rescue services, naval training, and 
maritime research services to the African Renaissance.90  At the same 
conference, the exchange of maritime surveillance information among 
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regions,91 a modern SAN maritime air-patrol capability, including flexible multi-
purpose ship-transportable helicopters in order to link up with other Southern 
African armed services, and maritime and naval co-operation could act as a 
confidence-building measures.92   
 
These suggestions can be interpreted as peace support activities, because it 
would assist African nations in helping themselves, and remove threats to 
peace when other nations may want to access precious resources, for 
instance.  The suggestions from Simpson-Anderson reflected what he 
deemed as possible peace support activities which the SAN could execute at 
the time, while the suggestion about the sharing of maritime surveillance 
information would require liaison through other government departments, and 
therefore something the SAN could not directly control.  Not being able to 
control events directly would require extensive inter-departmental negotiations 
with an even chance of success or failure. 
 
At the “A Navy for Africa” conference in 2001, Mudimo (then South African 
Chief of Naval Staff) concluded that the SAN must fulfil the requirement for 
security and confidence-building initiatives within the framework of the 
National Strategy and Foreign Policy of South Africa in order to promote 
regional co-operation in the SADC region.93  At the same conference, it was 
stated that the SAN intended to develop initiatives like sharing repair and 
training facilities with the region, developing interoperability with regional 
forces, assisting in creating a command doctrine and developing regional 
standing forces, acquiring multi-purpose hulls and a sealift capability, and 
developing an amphibious capability, a surveillance capability, and a 
riverine/inland water operational capability to assist where required in the 
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region.94  A regional maritime strategic forum,95 the sharing of facilities, the 
usage of ships, the establishment of standing naval forces96 and the carrying 
out constabulary functions in the region97 were suggestions of further possible 
contributions.   
 
The suggestions about co-operation on various levels were in tune with 
modern naval strategic thinking, but would require high-level governmental 
intervention, while the possible roles suggested included some which would 
be possible at the time, but also others which still had to be developed.  
Transforming navies into Coast Guards would require a change of philosophy 
which should tie in with government policy, while the acquisition of a Landing 
platform Helicopter Dock ship (LHD) was a good idea, but probably not readily 
possible in the light of budget restrictions and the commitment to the Strategic 
Defence Package. 
 
At the first “Sea Power for Africa” symposium in 2005, the importance of 
sea power for African navies (even if not specifically referring to the SAN) in 
order to protect a country‟s resources (like oil) was emphasized.98  The 
importance of co-operation among African Hydrographic Missions for the 
maritime charting of African harbours and maritime zones,99 and the need for 
a co-ordinating mechanism to ensure continued, effective and efficient training 
efforts were stressed.100  It was mentioned that the SAN‟s overall utility value 
in peace support operations would be severely restricted without strategic lift 
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and a limited amphibious capability,101 as well as that African navies should 
transform into functional and multi-faceted Coast Guards to protect African 
maritime resources.102  The strong argument for the SAN to acquire a Landing 
Platform Helicopter Dock ship (LHD) to enhance the SAN‟s contribution in 
peace support operations103 tied in with the formation of a contributory fleet for 
a post modern navy.104 
 
The suggestions about co-operation on various levels are good and in tune 
with modern naval strategic thinking, but would require high-level 
governmental intervention, while the possible roles suggested included some 
roles which would be possible at the time, but also others which still had to be 
developed.  Transforming navies into coast-guards would require a change of 
philosophy which should tie in with government policy, while the acquisition of 
a LHD was a good idea, but probably not readily possible in the light of budget 
restrictions and the commitment to the Strategic Defence Package. 
 
It was stated at the second “Sea Power for Africa” symposium in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in 2006, it was stated that African navies could overcome the 
challenge of excessive dependence on foreign technology by entering into a 
Joint Venture to acquire technology.105  It was pointed out that an imperative 
need existed to develop a framework for co-operation at both regional and 
sub-regional levels in order to optimise the comparative advantages and 
specialisation already acquired by a number of states in Africa (as the only 
way to build the naval capacity required).106   
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The resolutions agreed on at the symposium included undertakings such as 
all countries integrating into the Automated Identification System (AIS), 
embarking on regular sub-regional co-ordinated operational training, compiling 
expertise and core competence as a guide for other navies, instituting 
meetings of professionals like engineers, hydrographers and cartographers, 
and ensuring that a SADC naval component (as one of four Naval Task 
Groups led by Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa) become part of the 
African Union Standby Force within the next four years.107  
 
The suggestions on integrated AIS, co-ordinated training, compilation of 
competence guides, and meetings by professionals would require budget 
prioritisation by all navies, while the sharing of facilities would require 
governmental and civilian contractor co-operation.  A SADC naval component 
in the given time-scale was a practical and possible idea in which the SAN 
could participate. 
 
In his opening address of the SADC Standing Maritime Committee conference 
on “Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa” in 2007, the Chief of 
the SAN stated that the conference would focus on naval training, Naval 
Control and Guidance of Shipping (NCAGS), sea lift capabilities required for 
peace support operations in Africa, and the formation of a Maritime 
Component of the SADC Brigade.108  It was concluded that the Landing 
Platform (Helicopter/Dock) (LHD) could supply the most effective form of 
sealift, even if sealift was much slower than airlift.  Airlift and sealift were 
complimentary capabilities, but the LHD can conduct flexible helicopter 
operations, act as task force flagship, hospital ship, depot ship and lend itself 
to many more roles.109  It was conceded that the SAN‟s possible acquisition of 
a LHD would only be the beginning in the process of maximising its 
contribution as a regional and Sub-Saharan capability.110   
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With regard to NCAGS, the conference recommended that naval co-operation 
and guidance of shipping practice be used to increase commonality of 
systems and to improve interoperability between navies.111  It was explained 
that the SADC Standby Force (SADCSF) would have a military component, 
the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG), consisting of land, air, sea and medical 
forces pledged by the SADC member-states.112  The SAN contribution would 
include one Operational Diving team, five Harbour Patrol Boats, one large 
ship, and one platoon of the Maritime Reaction Squadron.113 
 
The suggestion about a LHD was again a good idea (as determined at a 
previous symposium), but restricted to the availability of funding, while the 
suggestion on NCAGS was practical and possible.  The SAN contribution to 
the SADCBRIG was in line with the suggestion at a previous symposium 
about a SADC naval component led by South Africa, even though the detail 
about such a deployment would need more investigation. 
 
During a visit by the SAS DRAKENSBERG to Mombasa, Kenya in 2007, the 
Institute for Security Studies organised a conference to discuss maritime 
security issues on the east coast of Africa, and more specifically to look at 
the role of maritime organisations and naval forces in supporting Africa‟s 
security and development.114  It was stated that navies of the region had an 
important peacetime function in support of the maintenance of good order at 
sea, and would require good regional and sub-regional co-operation and 
integration.115  In order to address the lack of maritime security, African navies 
should focus on their good capabilities, combine these capabilities to save 
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cost in the long run, and improve interoperability and communication.116  
African countries should co-ordinate their maritime surveillance and 
reconnaissance activities, and ensure that appropriate elements from their 
naval capabilities be placed at the disposal of the AU Standby Force.117  In 
concluding the conference, it was stated that collective actions by regional 
and sub-regional authorities were required, as well as joint law enforcement at 
sea, and the defining of the priority peacetime tasks of navies.118 
 
Collective and joint activities by regional and sub-regional authorities were 
good, practical suggestions, providing that the political leaders could be 
influenced to think similarly.  Interoperability and communication would 
probably require much practice, given the different naval assets and the 
different languages along the east coast of Africa. 
 
At the International Conference on “Maritime Security in Southern 
African Waters” in Stellenbosch in 2008, Mudimu (Chief of the SAN) told 
delegates that the biggest threat to maritime security in the region was 
complacency.119  At the same venue, it was pointed out that the disintegration 
of central government authority in Somalia led to a lack of maritime security in 
the Horn of Africa, allowing piracy to flourish, and also threatening peace and 
regional stability.120  While African navies mostly did not possess the tools to 
singly address maritime security off their coasts, these navies should combine 
their good capabilities (like the blue water capability of the SAN), and then 
develop the necessary enhanced integrated approach to maritime security 
(despite financial and material limitations).121  The SAN must be seen as a 
responsible regional partner, and as such, complement other African navies 
by providing capabilities they did not have, conduct operations on behalf of 
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African governments not possessing naval capabilities, and provide the core 
for multi-national maritime forces.122  African navies should be pragmatic 
about the SAN‟s role, and assist the SAN to reach an optimal co-operative 
arrangement for maritime security of the region.123 
 
Again the suggestion about combining capabilities to address maritime 
security was good and practically possible, provided that political leadership 
were aboard in the thought process and supplied the required funding.  Not 
duplicating the roles of other navies would be difficult, because inherently all 
navies carried out the same roles, and each navy‟s roles were determined by 
the country‟s military strategy. 
 
At the third Sea Power for Africa symposium (with the theme “Towards 
Effective Maritime Governance for Africa”), it was pointed out that the 
illegal operations in African waters (like poaching, drug smuggling, piracy and  
human trafficking) compromise maritime and human security, and impact on 
the economic growth of the continent.124  These illegal operations were the 
result of a lack of sea control due to a lack of naval capacity and poor 
maritime governance.125  It was also due to the lack of collective political and 
required military responses, with the military roles being that of deterrence, to 
combat the threat and alleviate the effects.126  In order to carry out these 
military roles in the most cost-effective way, the option of regional 
collaborative acquisitions of tried and tested platforms was suggested.127 The 
transcendental nature of maritime issues highlighted the need for regional 
maritime co-operation between maritime states.128  The effective regional co-
operation in the governance of African maritime interests would require the 
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decision makers in the various national governments within the region to 
collaborate on how to achieve effective governance of the ocean spaces of 
Africa.129  However, the lack of political will by African governments and 
decision makers to adequately invest in measures and structures for maritime 
security was a serious shortcoming.130   
 
To overcome the constraints, it was suggested that states with core 
competence in various areas of education and training should establish 
institutions in these states that other states could access, and that sub-
regional coast guards should be formed.131  Inter-agency and international co-
operation would be critical in the fields of information sharing, interoperability 
in sensor and processor systems, joint patrols, reciprocal rights of hot pursuit 
and extradition arrangements.132  It was confirmed that the SAN would work 
with the navies of the region to foster closer co-operation, strengthen existing 
relations, promote greater awareness in inland Navies and landlocked 
nations, and encourage Navies of the continent to play their constitutional 
mandates.133 
 
The suggestions on co-operation were essentially the same as at previous 
symposia, but a more positive step was the attendance by an AU 
representative.  However, the signing of a code of conduct indicated that it 
could still be a long time before African navies carry out combined operations 
under the auspices of the AU.  To work on closer co-operation and stronger 
relations were practical suggestions for the SAN, while creating awareness 
and encouraging navies probably needed more investigation. 
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In the observed symposia and conferences, the views expressed by serving 
and retired SAN officers at the different conferences were based on the 
general thinking, and the available assets, in the SAN at the time.  Some of 
the other speakers offered good, practical suggestions as to which missions 
and roles navies could execute towards promoting peace and prosperity in 
Africa.  Some suggestions by other speakers amounted to a wish-list which 
could not materialise in the near future (like acquiring strategic sealift and  
changing to coast guard navies), and would depend on how governments 
were affected by globalisation.  However, for all the practical advice offered 
and good ideas listed, there seemed to be little political will to supply the 
resources required to convert good ideas into working solutions.   
 
6.    SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE AND EXPECTED ROLES 
 
Not taking into account the roles the SAN performed historically, a summary 
from the possible roles suggested by the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN and 
the expected roles suggested by speakers at symposia and conferences are 
as follows: 
Table 1:  Roles suggested by Maritime Doctrine vs Roles suggested by 
Symposia and Conferences134 
Maritime Doctrine Symposia and Conferences 
Embargoes, sanctions, blockade 
and quarantine enforcement 
Embargo enforcement 
Peace support operations Providing logistic support, sealift, 
containment and disarming by 
maritime forces 
Anti-piracy operations Addressing maritime security, focus 
on and combine good capabilities 
Drug interdiction Joint law enforcement 
Anti-contraband operations Joint law enforcement 
Maritime counter terrorism  
Support to counter insurgency  
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operations 
Fishery protection Assistance to maritime resources 
protection 
Enforcement of maritime 
agreements 
 
Riverine and lake patrols Protection on rivers and lakes 
Humanitarian aid and disaster relief Regional and sub-regional co-
operation 
Border safeguarding Joint law enforcement 
Search and rescue Search and rescue services 
Hydrographic surveys Hydrographic survey services 
Support to other government depts  
 Contributing SA expertise, compile 
expertise 
 Maritime research services 
 Co-ordinating and exchange of 
maritime surveillance and 
reconnaissance activities 
 Mine clearance 
 Naval control and guidance of 
shipping 
 Maritime and naval co-operation, co-
ordinated naval training 
 Improving interoperability and 
communication 
 Sharing facilities and usage of ships 
 
Hence the roles and missions suggested by various speakers at different 
forums were in line with those envisaged in the Maritime Doctrine.  Not 
included in the Maritime Doctrine were the missions aligned with assistance 
from and co-operation from the SAN in terms of expertise, surveillance 
information, training and the sharing of assets.  The required roles and 
 64 
missions stated by the SADC MPSO 1A fell under Peace Support Operations, 
which were accounted for in the Maritime Doctrine. 
 
7.    CONCLUSION 
 
From the analysis of the history of the SAN, it is clear that political intentions 
rightly guided the possible roles of the SAN from its inception to the present.  
The assets with which to execute these roles were then procured as and 
when the budget was available.  The thinking on the possible roles persisted 
from the early (pre-1960) roles, centred around the protection of the SLOCs 
around the South African coast and the protection of South Africa‟s borders, to 
the present, even though the changing political environment during the 1960s 
allowed for forced changes and subsequent new assets.  This was visible in 
the requirements put forward in the SDP and the assets acquired.   
 
The changed world political environment since 1990, and the different political 
situation in South Africa since April 1994, added possible roles and missions 
for the SAN, some of which the SAN should be able to execute due to its size.  
The possible roles and contributions to peace support in Africa could then be 
the roles and missions reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine as derived from 
the White Paper on Defence and the SANDF Strategy.  More possible 
contributions could be added from the regional expectations, like the sharing 
of training, assets, expertise, information and the requirement for maintaining 
maritime security and the maintenance of good order at sea.  The 
maintenance of maritime security and good order at sea would depend on the 
influence of globalisation on African governments.  Taking all the suggested 
possible roles into account, the potential roles now need to be determined in 
terms of the resources available to the SAN.   
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CHAPTER 4 
PEACE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES:  IMPERATIVES AND THE POTENTIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
The possible roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support in 
Africa have been identified in previous chapters and shown to be relevant in 
terms of the perceived needs in Africa and those envisaged by the SAN.  All 
these contributions focus on peace support, which was identified as 
supporting the measures taken to prevent and remove threats to peace, 
including suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, 
as well as supporting the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
while conforming to the principles of international law and justice.  The 
possible contributions towards peace support must now be evaluated, taking 
into consideration the national security environment and imperatives, the 
impact of future budgets, and the assets currently available in the SAN (and 
those envisaged in the near future). 
 
2.    NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND IMPERATIVES 
 
The national security environment of South Africa will be analysed in terms of 
the national security objectives, the South African security culture, the shifting 
security environment and South African political preferences. 
 
2.1.    NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
 
The White Paper on Defence stated that national security was not viewed as a 
predominantly military and police problem, but was broadened to incorporate 
political, economic, social and environmental matters.135  The security of 
people was of paramount concern, and at national level, the objectives of 
security policy encompassed the consolidation of democracy, the 
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achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment, 
and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political 
instability.136  At the international level, the objectives of security policy 
included the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional 
security in Southern Africa.137  It is expected that the defence of sovereignty 
and the promotion of regional security will be allocated equal priority in the 
Defence Update (to be released in November 2009 but yet again postponed 
by the minister). 
 
The 1996 White Paper also confirmed that South Africa would pursue 
peaceful relations with other states and that South Africa‟s force levels, 
armaments and military expenditure would be determined by defence policy 
which was derived from an analysis of the external and internal security 
environment.138  It was acknowledged in the 1996 Defence White Paper that, 
after being welcomed into the UN, (then) OAU and SADC, South Africa was 
expected to play an active role in these forums, and get involved in multi-
national peace support operations on the African continent.139  With the policy-
determined force-levels, South Africa would fulfil its responsibility to 
participate in international peace operations as long as there were 
parliamentary approval and public support for such an involvement, a clear 
mandate, mission and objectives, authorisation by the UN Security Council, 
and sanction by SADC140 (if in the sub-region).  The national security objective 
of the promotion of regional security could therefore be interpreted as the 
participation in international peace operations by forces determined by the 
defence policy and the AU.   
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Neethling stated that the concept of national interest has traditionally been 
attached to the theory and practice of foreign policy.141  The national security 
objective of the promotion of regional security was further discussed in the 
South African Foreign Policy, where Africa was made the prime focus of future 
engagements (as stated in The White Paper on South African Participation in 
International Peace Missions 1999).142  South Africa had an obvious interest 
in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and 
development, and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the 
neighbourhood.143   
 
The negative effect of conflict spill-over was anticipated by observers in the 
mid-1990s when they pointed out that it would be in South Africa‟s economic 
interest to stabilise the region, and that South Africa could not prosper among 
African insecurity and instability.  Peacekeeping in Africa (and specifically 
Southern Africa) might therefore be considered by South Africa as action in 
direct support of its own security and economic interests.144  Neethling 
regarded the above-mentioned 1999 White Paper as the crucial framework 
and guideline for South Africa‟s participation in peace missions.145  Cilliers 
saw the same White Paper as the most important foreign policy document to 
pass through Cabinet (at the time), because it forced the South African 
government to outline its national interest, its philosophy on conflict resolution 
and its general approach towards Africa.146  Hence the SANDF roles would be 
directed by the foreign policy and the SANDF would be used as a foreign 
policy instrument.   
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The White Paper on National Defence made provision for a Defence Review 
which would entail comprehensive long-range planning on matters such as 
doctrine, posture, force design and levels, logistical support, armaments, 
equipment, human resources and funding.147  One of the concepts 
underpinning the 1998 Defence Review was the government‟s declaration of 
defence against external aggression as the primary function of the SANDF.148  
Any other function was a secondary function.  However, it was stated in the 
Defence Review that where self-defence capabilities were insufficient for 
certain secondary functions (such as peace support), additional capabilities 
might be required.149 These capabilities might include the provision of 
equipment, logistical support, humanitarian aid, engineering services, 
communication systems, and medical personnel and facilities.150  This would 
be aided by the spectrum of military diplomacy which is more of a naval 
expertise than an army or air force expertise.  It is this latter nuance that is 
expected to come over more clearly in the envisaged Defence Update with the 
attempt to bring the primary and secondary roles closer together.  
 
The emphasis on participation in regional peace support was reflected in the 
SANDF Military Strategy, where it was (as one of the three military strategic 
objectives) interpreted as the promotion of peace, security and stability in the 
region and on the continent, and further defined as the provision of external 
deployment or support to enhance security in support of the decisions of the 
executive.151  This was how the SANDF (as a state department) would act to 
support the national security objectives. 
 
This strategic military objective was interpreted in the SAN Doctrine as 
engaging in co-operative ventures with African countries in the fields of 
maritime defence planning, combined exercises, procurement of arms and 
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equipment, training and education, and the conduct of exchange visits.152  
The naval missions associated with this objective (and as derived from the 
SANDF missions) were defined as embargoes, peace support operations, 
anti-piracy operations, drug interdiction, fishery protection, riverine and inland 
lake patrols, support to counter-insurgency operations and enforcement of 
maritime agreements.153 
 
In summary, it can be stated that the national security objectives will definitely 
not limit, but rather will formally support or facilitate the execution of peace 
support activities in Africa as reflected and expanded upon in the White Paper 
on National Defence, the White Paper on Participation in Peace Missions 
(from the Foreign Policy department), the SANDF Strategy and the naval 
missions stated in the SAN Doctrine. 
 
2.2.    SECURITY CULTURE 
 
Williams stated that security cultures shape the way in which regional 
arrangements construct and respond to threats.  He defined security cultures 
as the beliefs and norms of a particular group about what constituted a 
security threat and which responses were considered appropriate and 
legitimate.154  This is similar to the Oxford Dictionary definition of culture as 
the customs, achievements, philosophy, etc of a particular group.155  Hence 
the customs and philosophy of the SANDF could be interpreted as an 
expression of security culture.  The national security objectives were further 
defined in the Defence Review as the SANDF self-defence functions of:  
 the promotion of regional security through defence co-operation 
within the SADC framework;156  
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 the promotion of international security through participation in 
peace operations and military co-operation in support of foreign 
policy; and  
 the provision of a core defence capability against internal and 
external threats.157   
 
The promotion of regional security as part of South Africa‟s emergent security 
culture is further supported in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
Strategic Plan 2009-2012 where it is stated that the principal focus of the 
South African foreign policy is the consolidation of the African Agenda.  One 
of the four pillars of the Agenda is the strengthening of South Africa‟s 
participation in the implementation of Africa‟s peace and security agenda and 
management of peace missions.158  The name of the department has since 
changed to the Department of International Relations and Co-operation. 
 
In the interpretation of the SANDF strategic objectives, the SAN doctrine listed 
the SAN missions required to reach the SANDF objectives of the promotion of 
peace, security and stability in the region, and the provision of support to the 
people of South Africa.159  Peace support activities, as defined for this study, 
would typically be found under these two objectives.   
 
The promotion of regional security as an element of South Africa‟s security 
culture was therefore visible in the Constitution, the various White Papers and 
eventually in the SAN doctrine.  Therefore the security culture would not limit 
the SAN‟s participation in peace support activities, but rather support it. 
 
2.3.    CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
For most people, the Cold War era ended in 1989, and the ideological and 
military confrontation dominating the foreign and defence policies of the major 
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antagonists and their allies made way for new policies of internationalism, co-
operation, openness and disarmament.160  South Africa, unlike the rest of the 
world, did not experience these changes at the time because of the political 
situation in the country, and only after the end of apartheid in 1994 was a 
period of transition initiated.161  Vrey explained this transition by means of the 
paradigm shift theory, where the thinking on South African defence moved 
from the pre-1994 Total Onslaught approach, to the post-1994 Democracy 
approach.162 
 
The pre-1994 SADF paradigm had a pre-emptive, operationally offensive 
strategic posture based upon a notion of security as a military and police 
problem.163  However, the government‟s foreign relations changed from an 
adversarial mode to bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation, and it was 
deemed that the defence policy should be in harmony with the foreign 
policy.164  Accordingly, Nathan stated that the post-1994 defence paradigm 
was dramatically different from its predecessor, but in line with broader 
defence thinking at the time, where interdepartmental and sub-regional 
defence co-operation (and its extension to regional and international levels) 
became focal points.165  The sub-regional co-operation had both defence and 
socio-economic goals, while regional and international conflict would be 
addressed in a preventative and co-operative way166 - indeed fundamentally 
different from the previous interventionist and coercive way. 
 
The post-1994 paradigm was entrenched in human security, democratic 
principles and non-isolation.167  Hence it was deduced that the primary 
function of the SANDF was self-defence, and by implication, the SAN‟s first 
responsibility was towards South Africa, and then towards SADC or the wider 
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African region.168  However, as the biggest economic and strongest military 
power in the region, South Africa was expected to have a balanced and 
flexible force which could play an important role in SADC security.169  The 
expectation was acknowledged in the planned contributions of the SANDF, 
and the SAN, to the SADC Brigade as part of the SADC Standby Force.170  
Hence the shifting security environment was apparently guiding future SANDF 
(and by implication, SAN) operations towards an emphasis on the execution 
of peace support activities.   
 
An example of the shifting security environment in Africa was the sharp 
increase in reported incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf 
of Aden.  Karamalikis (Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Navy) concurred 
that it was one of the challenges due to the rapidly changing security 
environment that was confronting the EU, NATO and the UN.171  Proof of the 
changing security environment was evident in the increase in annual reported 
piracy and armed robbery incidents at sea off the East African coast from 22 
in 2003 to 111 in 2008.172  A further increase was shown in the first quarter in 
2009 (61 incidents) compared to the first quarter in 2008 (6 incidents).173  
 
The lack of enforcement capacity and resources to address the problem of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia was of major concern to Somalia, as well as to 
some of the other affected littoral states of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Aden.174  This highlighted the need to identify an integrated approach 
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between the operational responses at sea and those on land.175  Hence the 
Security Council, in accordance with resolution 1816 (2008), called upon 
states and interested organisations, including the IMO, to provide technical 
assistance to Somalia and nearby states upon their request to enhance the 
capacity of these states to ensure coastal and maritime security.176  This way 
of dealing with the problem of piracy was previously observed by Till, when he 
stated that the maintenance of good order required an improved level of 
awareness, effective policy and integrated governance.177  He also confirmed 
that only a holistic all-round maritime approach could address the complexity 
and importance of the linkages between the different values of the sea and its 
many connections with events ashore.178  
 
In the same vein, Mudimu (Chief of the SAN) comments that maritime 
insecurity manifests itself when coastal states are vulnerable in the three 
areas of inadequate maritime domain awareness, the inability or lack of 
political will to institutionalise international protocols and local marine issues at 
national level, and a weak maritime infrastructure.179  This could lead to 
maritime threats such as piracy and other crimes like oil theft and human 
trafficking.180  Common denominators for this state of affairs appeared to be 
complacency and high levels of ignorance about maritime issues in Africa, 
and Mudimu suggested that the SAN would facilitate the enhancement of 
maritime security with the hosting of the Third Sea Power Symposium in order 
to make a case for urgent comprehensive and collaborative reform.181  On a 
more practical level, Heitman is of the opinion that, in order to support the 
suppression of piracy off Somalia, the SAN has the capacity to deploy a 
frigate with a boarding party, the SAS Drakensberg as a command and 
support ship, and a submarine (to gather intelligence).182  Hence the shifting 
security environment off the East African coast seems to guide the thinking at 
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different levels towards South African assistance in peace support activities in 
Africa. 
 
The shifting security environment in the world, around Africa, and in South 
Africa, would thus seem to support the participation of the SAN in peace 
support activities in Africa.  It must now be investigated whether political 
preferences reflect similar support. 
 
Figure 2: Map of Africa183   
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2.4.    POLITICAL PREFERENCES     
 
The political preferences of the South African government in terms of the 
existence and the usage of the SANDF were recorded in the White Paper on 
Defence, stating that South Africa would have a primarily defensive orientation 
and posture, pursue peaceful relations with other states, and seek a high level 
of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in 
particular.184   
 
The similar political preferences of Williams (a member of the former Military 
Research Group)185 were visible in the Defence Review where one of the 
SANDF tasks related to the self-defence function, was the promotion of 
international security through participation in peace operations and military co-
operation in support of foreign policy.186  Peace support operations would take 
place under the auspices of the UN Security Council, the AU, and SADC.  Any 
request for South African participation would be routed through the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).  After consultation with the Department 
of Defence (DoD) on potential involvement, the DFA and the DoD would then 
advise Cabinet before the final decision on participation would be taken.187  
This would confirm political approval before any operation could be started. 
 
The DFA‟s White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace 
Missions stated similarly that contemporary peace missions were 
fundamentally political initiatives, and that a careful appraisal of the political 
and strategic environment where peace missions were due should be made 
before participation could commence.188  The participation could be of a global 
nature, but the priority afforded Africa in the South African foreign policy would 
make Africa the prime focus of future engagements, particularly given South 
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Africa‟s obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability to promote 
trade and development, and avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the 
neighbourhood.189  The DFA would be the lead department in co-ordinating 
any South African participation in peace operations because such 
participation would be an extension of South African foreign policy, and would 
also take the lead in securing finances for South African participation in 
specific peace missions.190  The DOD would have the lead responsibility to 
oversee and manage the operational deployment and maintenance of SANDF 
contingents involved in peace support activities.191   
 
The political preferences of a peaceful stance and preferred assistance to 
Africa mentioned in the two White Papers and the Defence Review would 
clearly support the participation of the SANDF (and the SAN) in peace support 
activities in Africa.  However, Mandrup observed that, during the first post-
apartheid decade, South Africa showed great reluctance to undertake peace 
support activities for both political and practical reasons.192  He also noticed 
that the DoD informed policy-makers in March 2004 that the current level of 
operations could not be sustained without additional funding, or a political 
prioritisation of the tasks of the SANDF.193  In addition, the DFA had often not 
been able to secure the bridging funding required, and with a very small 
defence budget, the SANDF was relegated to an almost peripheral status in 
the South African political agenda.194  Mandrup was of the opinion that a lack 
of departmental co-ordination in government, and the tendency of politicians 
not to follow the guidelines in the 1999 White Paper on Peace Missions, were 
responsible for the lack of funding and availability of personnel in the 
SANDF.195  
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However, the increased deployment to international peace support activities 
(as requested by government) constituted firstly a reason for existence, and 
secondly, a justification for the state funding of the SANDF.196  Hence, the 
current political preferences were supportive of SANDF participation in peace 
support activities, with the only possible uncertainty being the DFA‟s 
willingness to accept disproportionate requests for participation.   
 
3.    FUTURE BUDGETS  
 
Adequate funding to prepare, train, support and sustain, is arguably one of the 
most important resources a navy requires in order to fulfil the expectations of 
its government.  In South Africa, the annual Estimates of National Expenditure 
(ENE), supplied by the National Treasury, offers an insight into past and 
present budgets of the SANDF and the SAN, or “Maritime Defence”.  The 
ENE of 2009 states that the main objective of the SANDF is to defend and 
protect South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people (as stated in the DoD 
Strategic Business Plan 2009), as well as provide support to UN and AU 
initiatives aimed at promoting peace, stability and security in Africa and 
SADC.197  With regard to peace support activities, the ENE of 2009 states that 
security, peace and stability in the region and the continent are promoted not 
only through peace support operations, but also through humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, support for government initiatives, and post-
conflict reconstruction and training, and the SANDF prepares annually to 
assist in support these operations through peace support.198   
 
According to the ENE of 2009, the SAN must defend and protect South Africa 
and its maritime zones by providing: 
 A surface combat capability of four frigates, one combat support 
vessel, three off-shore patrol vessels, three inshore patrol 
vessels, and a maritime reaction squadron; 
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 A sub-surface combat capability of three submarines; 
 Two mine countermeasures systems to ensure safe access to 
South African harbours, and where mine clearance may be 
required; and 
 An ongoing hydrographic survey capability to ensure safe 
navigation in charting areas and to meet an international 
obligation.199 
 
From the above (and the statement about the promotion of security, peace 
and stability in the region and continent), it seems that the compilers of the 
ENE of 2009 were aware of the SAN‟s obligations to contribute towards peace 
support activities, as well as the assets required for this contribution.  It must 
be taken into account that traditionally navies have always offered the 
inherent advantages of adaptability, flexibility and mobility on, under and over 
the sea,200 and hence the contribution towards peace support would be 
carried out with core defence capabilities without major changes to the 
platforms.  A table with some of the detail of the funding supplied towards 
supporting the SAN activities must now be scrutinised to find out if the 
awareness translates into financial enhancement, or limitation of the ability of 
the SAN to contribute. 
 
In the ENE of 2009, it is stated that the SAN expenditure (or budget) 
decreased at an average annual rate of 5,5% from financial year (FY) 2005/06 
to FY 2011/12 due to the commissioning of the new frigates and submarines, 
which were supplied by the Special Defence Package (SDP).201   The 
Available SAN Budget in Table 1 was then obtained by subtracting the SDP 
payments from the SAN Budget, from which the percentage increase (year-
on-year) was calculated.  When taking into consideration that inflation in 
South Africa increased from 4,5% in FY 2005/06 to 6,5% in FY 2008/09,202 
and comparing it to the percentage increase (year-on-year), there seems to 
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be a small average increase in the available budget every year from FY 
2006/07 to FY 2008/09.   
 
However, it must be kept in mind that in 2005 only one of the new frigates was 
handed over to the SAN and none of the new submarines were in South 
Africa yet.  This meant that the SAN budget was not yet required to support 
the frigates and submarines in terms of supplying the required spares when 
defects occur, and also in terms of supporting patrols and other exercises.  
The statement by Mudimu (the Chief of the SAN) that the SAN was 
underfunded203 could be seen against the background of the increase in 
assets and forces to be prepared and supported (new frigates and 
submarines), and the small increase in the budget from 2005 until 2008.  
Other new demands on the budget were the support and deployment of the 
MRS, and transfer payments204 to the Naval Dockyard (now under Armscor 
management). 
 
Table 2 – Funding Detail from ENE of 2009 (all Rand figures in 
millions)205 
Financial 
Year 
Available 
SAN 
Budget 
Percentage 
Increase 
(Year-on-
Year) 
Force 
Employment 
Budget 
Percentage 
Increase 
(Year-on-
Year) 
Inflation 
Percentage 
2005/06 R 1,365.7  R 1,605.4  4.5 
2006/07 R 1,445.0 5.8 R 1,508.0 6 4.0 
2007/08 R 1,643.9 13.7 R 1,581.2 4.6 5.0 
2008/09 R 1,782.2 8.4 R 1,798.0 6.4 6.5 
2009/10 R 1,968.3 10.4 R 1,801.8 0.2  
2010/11 R 2,050.6 4.1 R 1,862.0 3.2  
2011/12 R 2,121.4 3.5 R 1,978.5 6.2  
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It is known that South Africa will be reimbursed for its participation in UN 
peace missions, but that this will only take place after the start of the 
deployment, and that specific (bridging) finance will be required for such 
participation.206  With reference to such participation in peace operations, ex-
Defence Minister Lekota started lobbying in 2008 for an increase in the 
Defence Budget, stating that additional funds were required in order to honour 
South Africa‟s peacekeeping obligations.207  He also added that if the present 
level of involvement of the SANDF in peacekeeping operations were to be 
sustained, or additional missions undertaken, the budget approach should 
reflect that those operations and missions would be part of the SANDF‟s 
regular tasks instead of incidental deployments.208  While the ENE of 2009 
seemed to have taken note of Minister Lekota‟s lobbying in terms of 
acknowledging the SANDF‟s role in peace support activities, the budget was 
not increased accordingly.   
 
The Force Employment (Regional Security) budget must provide for the 
deployment of forces in support of South Africa‟s commitment to regional, 
continental and global security, but, assuming that inflation will more or less 
stay at the same level until 2012, then the detail in Table 1 confirms no 
increases for the SAN in the immediate future. 
 
Taking into account the budget figures for the future as explained in the ENE 
of 2009, and the demands on the SAN in terms of force preparation and 
sustenance, it can be stated that future participation by the SAN in peace 
support activities (beyond its present involvement) will be limited.  Increased 
participation can only become reality if some of the roles of the SAN are 
scaled down (or disregarded) in favour of increased peace support 
participation, or if the SANDF budget is increased with subsequent increases 
in the SAN and Force Employment budgets.  
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4.    ASSETS AVAILABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY 
 
The SAN‟s hard assets available to contribute towards peace support 
activities are vessels, the landward bases and units, and perhaps most 
important, the personnel.  Present vessels of the fleet and future vessel 
acquisitions will be analysed for their potential contributions, while the bases 
and units will be listed.  The shortage of skilled personnel and capacity will be 
discussed in detail.  Among the soft assets which can contribute are the 
experience gained in various training fields and the experience and 
professionalism of the SAN hydrographic branch. 
 
4.1.    PRESENT ASSETS OF THE FLEET 
 
The four SAN MEKO A-200 frigates provide the surface combat capability of 
the SAN.  They are intermediate size vessels with good sea-keeping 
characteristics, capable of sustainable operational presence.209  These 
frigates are multi-purpose vessels capable of operating individually, or jointly 
as members of a task force.  Their primary role is to execute combat missions, 
but because of their multi-dimensional nature, their secondary roles include 
the following:  
 participation in peace support operations in Africa; 
 evacuation of civilian nationals from littoral states in times of 
crisis;  
 patrolling of South Africa‟s and other SADC states‟ territorial 
waters and EEZs for:  
o the protection of marine resources against poaching and 
pollution, and  
o law enforcement (ie the prevention of piracy, the 
smuggling of illegal weapons, substances and 
contraband); and  
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 search and rescue (SAR) missions within the South African 
international SAR area of responsibility.210   
 
These frigates are therefore well suited to contribute to peace support 
activities (operating in secondary roles), especially with the ships‟ flight decks 
being large enough to accommodate the SA Air Force Oryx helicopters and 
designed-for Super Lynx helicopters211.  Theoretically it will then be possible 
for the SAN to commit one frigate to assist in the anti-piracy patrols off the 
Horn of Africa (HOA).   
 
Such a deployment will require a support organisation for the frigate, which 
will probably consist of a civilian support agency in the closest harbour, and 
the deployment of a support ship to enable the frigate to stay on station and 
be maximally effective.  For effective continuous assistance to the patrols over 
an extended period, a second frigate will have be prepared and ready in 
South Africa to relieve the frigate on patrol after a specified period.  This will 
require a change to the current planning for SAN ships‟ deployment because 
the cost of spares to support the frigate on patrol, as well as keeping the only 
SAN support ship in assistance, will challenge the SAN budget, as already 
pointed out.   
 
There are other European naval support ships currently assisting EU and 
NATO naval ships in the HOA area, but since no relationship between South 
Africa and the EU or NATO exists, such support is not considered to be an 
option.  A possible option might be a Ship Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) for 
support, but the budgetary and regulatory implications will probably be 
significant, given that South Africa is not in a state of war, and therefore will 
probably have to “hire” STUFT at commercial rates.  A further challenge to 
this option is that South Africa has no such vessels and no agreement is in 
place.   
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Conventional submarines can play a major role in littoral maritime warfare 
because of their mobility, versatility and resilience.212  The three SAN Type 
209 submarines are very well suited to the protection of maritime territorial 
integrity, SLOCs, and merchant vessels, as well as carrying out expeditionary 
and sea denial operations.  However, submarines can operate “unseen”, and 
can therefore carry out a wide range of peace support activities like 
surveillance, reconnaissance, situation analysis and verification.213 
 
Deploying small submarines (such as the SAN 209s) away from home will 
require a sizeable support organisation at the nearest base, as well as 
assistance from a support ship.  Submarines are heavily dependent on expert 
maintenance, and splitting the submarine support resources between South 
Africa and another country will require rigorous planning and sound budgeting.  
It is also not known whether any of the European or the US Navy is deploying 
submarines in the HOA area, for example.   
 
The strike craft were intended to increase the surface-to-surface strike 
capability of the SAN when originally acquired (launched between 1977 and 
1986) and would serve as an effective deterrent from aggression at sea.214  
The two strike craft currently in commission are thought to be well suited for a 
range of coastal operations, from patrols through the interception of suspect 
craft to insertion operations.215  While not possessing the endurance of the 
frigates, their high speed and ability to go close inshore is a useful capability, 
particularly for deploying small, fast boats to go right inshore.216   
 
Small ships like strike craft are heavily dependent on regular maintenance and 
support from a shore base and a support ship (more so as the ships get 
older).  A SAN technical contingent will have to be deployed to the nearest 
shore base for assistance.  For maximum effect, SAN and Kenyan ships (for 
operations off the HOA, for example) will probably have to be deployed 
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together which will require good command and control, and training in 
preparation. 
 
At present, the roles of the SAN River class minehunters are coastal patrol, 
diving support and training after a decision in 2004 not to upgrade the vessels‟ 
minehunting systems (due to difficulty in maintaining the systems).217  Proving 
very useful in assisting the clearance of smaller wrecks in the Congo River in 
1990, the two commissioned vessels218 can still contribute where diving 
support and coastal patrols are required in support of peace.  In terms of 
deploying these ships away from home, it must be noted that they are also 
very dependent on regular maintenance and support from a shore base. 
 
The combat support vessel (SAS Drakensberg) can provide underway 
replenishment of fuel, water, stores and ammunition to enable the SAN to 
conduct blue water operations as well as foreign deployments and limited 
sustained operations.219  The SAS Drakensberg can also be invaluable in 
contributing to peace support activities like  
 the limited transport of land forces and their equipment;  
 the provision of limited hospital/medical facilities and temporary 
accommodation for refugees;  
 the transport of material and equipment to areas where social 
disturbances or natural disasters have caused humanitarian 
distress;  
 general tasks in support of other state departments; and,  
 the provision of a platform for helicopter operations.220 
 
The SAS Drakensberg will have to be deployed in assistance if other SAN 
ships and submarines are deployed away from home for an extended period, 
and because it is the only SAN support ship, crew rotation will probably have 
to take place if it is to be kept on station for an extended period. 
                                                 
217
Bennett and Soderlund, op cit, p 99.  
218
 Ibid, p 98. 
219
 Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy, op cit,  p 56. 
220
 Ibid. 
 85 
 
The three SAN inshore patrol vessels (IPVs or T-craft) are lightly armed 
with a limited deployment capability and provide a patrol capability for 
assistance in policing roles.221  These IPVs can form an inner layer of defence 
against small vessels, and ensure sufficient inshore presence in support of 
peace activities like the enforcement of state authority, the upholding and 
restoration of law and order, and the patrolling of inshore waters in other 
African countries.222  These craft are even more dependent on regular support 
from shore workshops than the small ships. 
 
The harbour protection boats were acquired for patrolling South African 
harbours to prevent sabotage and insurgency, as well as carry out range 
clearance and ferry crews to naval ships in harbour approaches.223  These 
boats are transportable by sea, road, rail or air, and can therefore carry out 
patrols, board and inspect ships and land shore patrols at key points in African 
harbours.224  The patrol boats are fairly easy to support and will require a less 
intensive support organisation. 
 
The Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS) of the SAN was commissioned in 
December 2008 and was formed by the merging of the Operational Boats 
Squadron, the Rapid Deployment Force and two Operational Diving Teams 
(ODTs).225  The tasks of the MRS are the following:   
 conducting interdiction, patrol and escort operations in coastal, 
lake and riverine areas;  
 boarding of suspicious ships to counter criminal and illegal 
activities at sea;  
 combating piracy and smuggling;  
 carrying out operational diving and salvage operations;  
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 augmentation of land forces; carrying out beachhead operations 
and spotting duties for naval gunfire support;   
 supplying specialised boats crews for combat and combat 
support ships on deployment, as well as force protection of 
vessels when in harbour or approaches during deployment.226 
 
The MRS can make a big contribution when deployed on board the frigates, 
strike craft and/or the support ship when being used to board and interrogate 
suspicious ships and boats off the HOA.  This will probably require more 
intensive training which can be obtained from navies experienced in such 
operations.  A challenge exists in how to deploy the MRS ashore (with a base 
camp consisting of 33 6m containers, boats and vehicles)227 with very limited 
sea- and airlift capability available in the SANDF.  
  
The SAN fulfils its regional and international obligations to provide a 
hydrographic service to the maritime community through its survey vessel 
(SAS Protea) and the hydrographic infrastructure ashore.228  The 
Hydrographic Office ashore at the Silvermine complex is authorised through 
the International Hydrographic Organisation to distribute paper charts and 
Electronic Navigational Chart (ENC) products, and is the only hydrographic 
organisation in Africa producing ENCs.229  The SAN Hydrographic office was 
recently acknowledged as being a “mature centre of expertise in the region” 
by the UK National Hydrographer230 and hence this soft asset can make a 
contribution to peace support in the region, because no ships supporting 
peace support activities will enter harbours without reliable and up-to-date 
charts. 
 
Landward bases are important assets in terms of assisting peace support 
activities.  Naval Base Simon’s Town supplies general support, while training 
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is supplied by SAS Saldanha (basic training), SAS Simonsberg (specialised 
training) and SAS Wingfield (technical training).231  Training for officers take 
place at SA Naval College (formative training) and SA Naval Staff College 
(Junior Staff and Warfare Course).232   
 
Logistical support can be given by Fleet Maintenance Unit (maintenance and 
repair beyond ships‟ own abilities) and the Naval Dockyard (maintenance and 
repair beyond ships and Fleet Maintenance Unit capabilities).233  Naval 
Station Durban is not only important as a SAN presence in South Africa‟s 
busiest harbour, but can play an important support role as the only SAN base 
on the east coast of Africa.  Support distances to the HOA area, the Prince 
Edward Island group and nearby East African harbours are shortened from 
Durban.  However, for proper support to SAN ships, the facilities at the base 
will probably have to be upgraded, which will be counter to the original 
decision to scale the base down in the late 1990s.  SAN ships can also be 
supplied with support when deployed away from South Africa by contracted 
shipping agents, and a Transportable Logistics Support organisation.234     
 
The SAN Diving centre at SAS Simonsberg has already provided diving 
training for members from Malawi, Tanzania and Nigeria, while officers from 
SADC have attended courses at the SA Naval Staff College 235 – more soft 
assets from the SAN that can contribute to peace support. 
 
4.2.    FUTURE ASSETS 
 
In four to six years‟ time, the SAN will acquire six inshore and offshore 
patrol vessels (OPVs and IPVs) under Project Biro.236  These vessels will be 
armed and used to stop crimes along the country‟s shoreline such as drug 
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smuggling, human trafficking and poaching.237  The OPVs and IPVs will 
replace the three remaining strike craft (about 29 years old) and the three 
IPVs (T-craft - about 16 years old) currently in service,238 and take over their 
patrolling roles.  
 
Under Project Hotel, the SAN is planning to replace its hydrographic survey 
vessel (SAS Protea – 36 years old) in the future, as well as establishing a 
mobile hydrographic survey team.239  According to Teuteberg (SAN Chief 
Director Maritime Strategy), the SAN has also received permission to 
investigate a strategic sealift capability which would be operated by the SAN 
on behalf of the entire SANDF.240  Such a strategic sealift ship can contribute 
in peace support activities like the following: 
 Deploying and support of forces carrying out peace support. 
 Supplying offshore command and support facilities for joint 
forces conducting operations in the littoral. 
 Command and underway support of a naval task group 
conducting offshore operations. 
 Assist non-combatant evacuations, and disaster and 
emergency relief operations.241  
 
The SAN is acquiring a core capability for Mine Warfare Operations, which 
will not depend on dedicated mine counter-measure vessels.242  This 
capability will consist of unmanned or remote controlled vehicles for mine 
detection and neutralisation, and will be operated from vessels of 
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opportunity.243  Project Mapantsula will replace the SAN minehunters and 
already phased-out minesweepers with a modular minehunting system.244   
 
The present and future SAN vessels, and the bases and units, seem to be 
adequate and useful assets to carry out possible peace support activities, but 
with the limitations of a restricted sealift capability, no minehunting capability 
and old ships to perform hydrographic survey, offshore and inshore patrolling.  
Up to now, the SAN has only conducted patrols on Lake Tanganyika, and 
carried out VIP protection in Burundi, which represents a small percentage of 
the possible SAN contributions to peace support activities in Africa.  Further 
limitations which can prevent a more significant contribution must now be 
investigated. 
 
4.3.    LACK OF SKILLS AND CAPACITY 
 
One of the lessons from the Battle of the Nile that was repeated in the SAN 
Maritime Doctrine was that “men matter most”.245  Ultimately it was the people 
that constituted the fighting power of an armed force.  The White Paper on 
Defence stated that one of the features required from military professionalism 
was the maintenance of technical, managerial and organisational skills and 
resources, which would enable the components of the SANDF to perform their 
primary and secondary functions effectively and efficiently.246  For political, 
strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF would be an all-volunteer force, 
and the DoD would have to design appropriate strategies to attract high 
quality recruits, secure the required rate of turnover, and develop functional 
and technical skills.247  It is therefore very important to note that in December 
2008, Pillay (SAN Director of Maritime Plans) stated that the SAN was moving 
“aggressively” to address an on-going loss of skills caused by sailors 
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resigning to follow more lucrative careers in the local and international 
maritime industry.248  He further stated that the SAN had lost an average of 
200 sailors a year in the combat, engineering and technical musterings since 
2004.249  If one takes into consideration that the new frigates and submarines 
bought as part of the Strategic Defence Package were being delivered from 
2004 onwards, such a loss of skills could quite possibly have negatively 
influenced the successful integration of the new vessels into the Fleet. 
 
A shortage of skilled staff in the SAN was nothing new, and it was already 
noticed (due to various reasons) in 1966 (and probably before), and again in 
1977 when it was reported to be due to problematic SADF personnel policies, 
poor contractual requirements and a lack of incentives.250  In 1996, it was 
highlighted that the key to maintaining a modern navy with high-technology 
and personnel-substitutive equipment, was the existence of highly-trained 
officers and operatives.251  It was also emphasized that if SAN personnel were 
lost, it would take years to train others and for them to acquire the necessary 
experience.252   
 
In 2001, Teuteberg (then SAN Acting Director Naval Personnel) confirmed 
that the SAN faced challenges around the supply of human resources in order 
to provide the output required from the SAN.253  He acknowledged that the 
introduction of the new corvettes and submarines would place much stress on 
the organisation, and the unacceptably high loss of expertise at the time 
would severely constrain the staffing and maintenance of the newly acquired 
ships and submarines.254  Strategies to stem the outflow of expertise, mainly 
in the technical and combat environments, were introduced, such as a 
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graduated, competence-linked, remuneration/incentive contract scheme, 
among others.255 
 
The struggle to retain specialised or scarce skilled personnel was emphasized 
in the briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Defence on its oversight visit in 
2007.256  The limited availability of the scarce skills in the country made the 
lost personnel difficult to replace at a time when the SAN was working towards 
increasing its relevance in the African battle space, and alignment with the 
broader government initiatives.257  The committee expressed concern over the 
possible impact on the SAN‟s ability to secure the South African coastlines 
and accepted that the retention of the institutional memory of the SAN was 
critical.258 
 
The SAN Director of Maritime Plans stated that special allowances and 
incentives were being negotiated for submariners, training for divers was 
being upgraded and allowances for technical personnel were being 
reviewed.259  The Flag Officer Fleet was of the opinion that better pay for SAN 
personnel would help with the retention of skilled members.260  The Military 
Skills and Development System (MSDS) would also act as an important 
feeder for the SAN into the future.261   
 
However, with historical problematic retention of skilled personnel, 
forewarning in the White Paper, and subsequent continuing acknowledgement 
of problematic retention of skilled personnel, allowances and incentives might 
only have limited success.  Therefore the loss of skilled personnel might well 
continue.  It is quite possible that the shortage of skilled personnel might 
negatively affect the ability of the SAN to participate in peace support activities 
where more skilled personnel are required for instance when more ships are 
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deployed, or when more skilled instructors at training institutions are required 
due to higher trainee numbers.  This would particularly be the case when 
SADC military personnel are accepted to be trained.   
   
In a briefing on the Department Budget 2009/10, Sisulu (South African 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans) stated that the recession was 
eroding the capacity of the SANDF.262  She also mentioned that Cabinet had 
not yet discussed the sending of naval assets to support the international fight 
against piracy off the Horn and east coast of Africa.  At the same briefing, 
Ngwenya (Chief of the SANDF) remarked that the only reason why no naval 
assets had yet been sent was the uncertainty about how to support the ships 
off the east coast of Africa.263  If capacity is defined as “the maximum amount 
of effort that can be produced”,264 then the negative effect of a recession on 
the SAN budget and loss of expertise will prevent the maximising of effort.  It 
is possible that this will introduce uncertainty about long and expensive 
deployments of ships away from their home base (and their support) – 
deployments typical of peace support operations.  The lack of skilled 
personnel and the availability of older ships will also prevent the maximising of 
effort required to participate in peace support activities.  It can therefore be 
stated that a shortage of capacity exists in the SAN which does, and in the 
future will, limit its participation in peace support. 
 
The shortage of skills and capacity will limit the participation by the SAN in 
future peace support activities of enhanced support when compared to the 
present.  This will be visible in the following areas:  
 where more skilled personnel are required (whether on board 
ships deployed or in training institutions where more trainees 
require training); and  
 where more capacity than presently available is required. 
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5.    CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of the chapter was to evaluate the possible contributions by the SAN 
towards peace support in Africa against the national security environment, 
identified limitations like the impact of future budgets and current and future 
SAN assets.  The limitations were analysed in terms of their ability to support 
future SAN contributions.  Current assets like ships, bases and personnel 
were analysed in terms of their possible contributions in the near future, while 
the possible contributions of the future assets were noted.   
 
The national security objectives, the security culture, the political preferences 
of the South African government and the shifting security environment in 
Africa support the participation of the SAN in peace support activities as 
described in the SAN Maritime Doctrine and expected by other countries in 
the region.  However, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN to 
peace support will be limited by the capabilities of the present assets, future 
budgets and the shortages of skills and capacity.   
 
The analysis of the possible contributions of the current and future assets 
revealed that the SAN could definitely contribute towards peace support 
activities (even with the present restrictions of limited sealift, no minehunting 
capability and elderly ships) like the following: 
 
 Peace support operations in Africa. 
 Patrols of South African and other SADC states‟ territorial waters and 
EEZs to protect marine resources and enforce the law (in combating  
smuggling and piracy). 
 Carrying out Search and Rescue missions. 
 Carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance, situation analysis and 
verification. 
 Coastal operations like interception of suspect craft, and insertion 
operations. 
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 Limited transport of land forces and their equipment, and material and 
equipment to assist where natural disasters occurred. 
 Provision of limited hospital and medical facilities. 
 Support of other state departments. 
 Providing a platform for helicopter operations. 
 Conducting interdiction, patrol and escort operations in coastal, lake 
and riverine areas. 
 Boarding suspicious ships. 
 Carrying out operational diving and salvage operations. 
 Supplying hydrographic services. 
 Supplying basic, formative and technical training. 
 Supplying logistical support for ships. 
 
It also showed that the present limitations would be negated significantly by 
the acquisition of future assets. 
 
While limited peace support activities can be executed with present assets, 
future budgets will prevent any extension of the present involvement in peace 
support, unless the roles and missions in the present doctrine are scaled 
down.  The minimising of effort towards peace support activities due to 
shortages means that some activities can be executed, but the budget 
available will not allow participation in activities beyond those being 
undertaken at present.       
 
Unless more funding is received, the potential roles and contributions of the 
SAN towards peace support activities in Africa cannot extend beyond some 
lake patrols and VIP protection.  Hence, even with fine new frigates and 
submarines available, participation in peace support activities will remain sub-
optimal.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.    SUMMARY 
 
In summary, the research question for the study initially arose from “How can 
the SAN contribute to peace support in Africa?”  According to Vice Admiral 
Mudimu  (present Chief of the SA Navy), the SAN contributed primarily 
through the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake 
Tanganyika in Burundi, and by assistance from the Maritime Reaction 
Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi.  To enhance its visibility, it was 
stated that the SAN should preferably play a bigger role in peace support in 
Africa. 
 
To discuss the possible further contributions of the SAN to peace support in 
Africa (with events on land creating increased insecurity), the traditional roles 
for navies and the doctrines of navies (specifically those involved in peace 
support operations) were investigated.  Thoughts on the possible roles of the 
SAN historically centred around the protection of the SLOCs around the South 
African coast and the protection of South Africa‟s borders, even though the 
changing political environment during the 1960s allowed for forced changes 
and subsequent new assets.  In a similar vein, the changed world political 
environment since 1990, and the changed South African political situation 
since April 1994, added possible roles and missions for the SAN.  These roles 
and missions were reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine (2006) and the SA 
Navy Review (2001).  Growing regional expectations added room for more 
roles and missions. However, the identification of these roles and missions 
would have been of academic value only, unless matched with assets 
available to the SAN.   The assets available in the SAN (and the future assets) 
were evaluated against identified limitations like the national security 
environment, budgetary limitations that might be experienced in the future, 
and the shortage of skills and capacity.   
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2.    FINDINGS 
 
From the discussion on traditional roles and doctrines of navies, it was found 
that generally the roles emanating and evolving from the traditional roles were 
assimilated into navies‟ doctrines, roles and tasks, and these were found to be 
effective in preventing threats to peace.  From the history of the SAN, it 
appears that political intentions have strongly influenced the possible roles of 
the SAN from its inception to the present.  The present possible contributions 
to peace support activities were found to range from peace support operations 
(including riverine and lake patrols) to joint law enforcement (like drug 
interdiction, anti-contraband operations, embargoes, anti-piracy operations, 
fishery protection) to humanitarian aid, disaster relief, search and rescue 
services and hydrographic surveys.  Regional expectations (as expressed 
over the last ten years) added roles and missions like the sharing of training, 
assets, expertise, information and the requirement of maintaining maritime 
security and the maintenance of good order at sea.        
 
The nature of the changing national security environment and imperatives 
supported the greater participation of the SAN in peace support activities as 
described in the SAN Maritime Doctrine (2006) and expected by other 
countries in the Southern African region.  From the analysis of the present and 
future SAN vessels, and the bases and units, it was found that, even with the 
limitations of a restricted sealift capability, no minehunting capability and old 
ships to perform hydrographic survey, offshore and inshore patrolling, these 
assets seem adequate for utilisation in peace support activities like  
 peace support operations in Africa; 
 patrols of South African and other SADC states‟ territorial waters and 
EEZs to protect marine resources and enforce the law (in combating  
smuggling and piracy); 
 Search and Rescue missions; 
 carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance, situation analysis and 
verification; 
 coastal operations like interception of suspect craft, and insertion 
operations; 
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 provision of limited hospital and medical facilities; 
 support of other state departments; 
 provision of a platform for helicopter operations; 
 conducting interdiction, patrol and escort operations in coastal, lake 
and riverine areas; 
 boarding suspicious ships; 
 operational diving and salvage operations; 
 supplying hydrographic services; 
 supplying basic, formative and technical training; and 
 supplying logistical support for ships. 
 
However, in spite of the newly acquired naval platforms, the potential roles 
and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by future 
budgets and the shortages of skills and capacity.  Unless more funding is 
received, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace 
support activities in Africa will probably not extend beyond the recent lake 
patrols and VIP protection. 
 
The acceptance of the limitations must mean understanding and managing 
them in order to execute the peace support missions discussed in the study.  
The asset limitations and shortages of funding, skills and capacity suggest 
that emphasis must be placed on ways to minimise the effect of the shortages 
in order to enable greater participation in peace support activities.   
 
3.    RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following recommendations indicate matters requiring further study, such 
as what can be contributed with the resources available, as well as how to 
minimise the effect of the shortages of skills and capacity. 
 
An aspect requiring more inquiry is the landward deployment of the MRS.  
The policing capabilities of the MRS beyond the recent lake patrols and VIP 
protection must be investigated, as well as the functioning of the MRS 
complement as part of a bigger force involved in peace support activities.  
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The wider use of a combat support ship (like SAS Drakensberg) will also 
warrant further study.  Deployed in anti-piracy operations with MRS forces to 
assist in boarding operations and a mix of helicopters on board, the ship could 
possibly carry out limited sealift in assistance of peace support operations, 
and conduct anti-piracy patrols off the HOA.  
 
Another area worthy of further inquiry is the shortage of funding.  This 
includes topics like continued lobbying for a bigger budget,1 and more focused 
budget allocations and in-depth expenditure control in the areas where 
participation in peace support activities can be improved.    
 
An important aspect which can be explored is how the shortage of skills and 
capacity can be eliminated by concentrating on training in as many areas as 
possible.  With skill being defined as “expertness, practised ability”,2 it must be 
accepted that the training to achieve the various skills will take time, with the 
necessary repeated practice.  With no immediate threats to national security 
and various established training facilities available, the SAN can concentrate 
on training members to the required standards.   
 
At the same time, members from African navies can also be trained at SAN 
facilities (without compromising the numbers of SAN members under training).  
The real value of such a study into training must identify how it should be 
carried out, and how to utilise opportunities like multinational exercises, SAN 
ships‟ patrols, goodwill visits to African navies, and assistance in sharing 
maritime surveillance information to enhance members‟ knowledge and 
experience.  This will be a major contribution to peace support activities, and 
more specifically to interoperability and understanding. 
 
It may also be worthwhile to investigate the possibility of linking up with the 
US Navy‟s African Partnership Station programs.  Undergoing the same 
training can improve interoperability and understanding of the African navies‟ 
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ways of thinking and handling situations.  However, a SAN/US Navy 
partnership may not be politically acceptable to the SA government, or to 
other African governments because of the connection to AFRICOM (the new 
US Africa Command).       
 
As the SAN is part of the National Defence Force of South Africa, it has the 
responsibility to always be prepared to fulfil its primary role.  However, despite 
its primary function and the fact that it is geared for it, most of the operational 
hours spent by the SAN (and other navies for that matter) from 1991 onwards, 
have to do with its secondary roles.  Therefore it appears that the SAN can 
make a better contribution towards peace support activities in Africa than has 
been the case up to now.  To do it will require careful management of the 
present assets and a sensible application of available funding.  Training must 
form the hub of all evolutions in the SAN whereby the minimising of the effects 
of scarce skills, and a larger contribution towards peace support, can be 
effected. 
 
Navies are historically prominent because they perform tasks over a wider 
spectrum than is common for other services.  One way in which the SAN can 
fulfil a prominent and very necessary role within the context of the present 
international security paradigm, is in the field of peace support operations.  
Besides the real political gains and support to national and regional strategic 
objectives, it would enhance the image of the SAN as a national asset.   
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